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1.1. Introduction: Scene-setter 
(Jan Bečka, Jakub Landovský, Martin Riegl)
For the last two years, migration became one the most discussed topics 
in many European countries. With the waves of refugees and migrants in gene-
ral arriving to Europe from the war-torn countries of the Middle East and from 
African countries, the European political representatives as well as the general 
public have been largely caught off guard. By September 2016, for example, 
there were almost 120,000 first-time asylum seekers in the EU-28.1 According 
to the UNHCR, there were 362,376 migrants and refugees arriving to Europe 
just by the Mediterranean route in 2016, not counting others.2 The migration 
flows that Europe has been witnessing as a part of the current crisis are the big-
gest since the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s and perhaps the most significant 
since the end of Second World War. 
Throughout Europe, the reactions to the migration crisis varied. Some co-
untries, like Germany, have pursued a welcoming policy towards migrants, 
pledging to accept them in great numbers and integrate them into the society. 
On the other hand, the sheer numbers of migrants and refugees coming to Eu-
rope have also created a backlash, with certain segments of society but also po-
liticians using the issue to call for more restrictive asylum and migration poli-
cies, for strengthening the EU border protection (in some cases going so far as 
to effectively suspend Schengen rules, albeit temporarily) and for building walls 
and fences. It is clear by now that the current European migration discourse 
is moving within a very wide spectrum of opinions, attitudes and approaches, 
shaped not only by national attitudes and concerns but also by economic, so-
cial, ethnic and in some cases religious factors. At the same time, the issue 
of migration is often coupled with security threats such as international terro-
rism, the situation in Syria and Iraq (from where many of the migrants/refugees 
1 The number of asylum seekers has reached its peak so far in October 2015 with almost 180,000 first-
time asylum applicants. For more information, see “Asylum Quarterly Report”, Eurostat, http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report [accessed: 15.02.2017].
2 “Refugees/Migrants Response – Mediterranean”, UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/
regional.php [accessed: 15.02.2017].
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actually originate)3 and, in some cases, even with the developments in Eastern 
Europe and the attempts of Russia to destabilize and weaken the European 
Union using various means. Migration has thus become a security issue while 
at the same time, the humanitarian aspect is always present. This dichotomy 
makes it often hard for the public but even the politicians to discuss the roots 
and causes of the migration crisis and the possible solutions objectively and 
without bringing in populist and sometimes even racist undertones. 
The Czech Republic, which this chapter deals with, is in a particular posi-
tion when it comes to the migration crisis. For the vast majority of migrants/re- 
fugees, it has served neither as the destination country nor even as the transit 
country as they bound for Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Inde-
ed, for the entire year 2016, there were only 1,475 people applying for asylum 
in the Czech Republic (as compared to 1,525 in 2015 and 1,156 in 2014).4 Gi-
ven such a low number, it can be asserted with a degree of confidence that most 
citizens of the Czech Republic have not encountered any newly arrived refu-
gees/migrants even at the height of the migration crisis. Yet, at the same time, 
the Czech Republic is among those European countries that are most vocal 
in criticizing “liberal migration policies” and that call for tougher measures to 
be taken on the external borders while at the same time repeatedly rejecting 
quotas for resettling the migrants in the individual EU member states. On the 
domestic political scene, a number of political parties and groupings were es-
tablished in the wake of the refugee crisis, using the anti-migration rhetoric 
(often coupled with a strong criticism of the EU) as a way to gain public sup-
port. Even some politicians from the mainstream political parties have picked 
up on the topic. One of the questions that this short case-study will be trying 
to answer is why is the debate about migration often so emotional in the Czech 
Republic, when, in fact, at the moment there is little reason for it. What are the 
main factors behind the prevalent Czech attitude towards migration, both on 
the political level and among the public? 
The primary purpose of this chapter, however, is to provide the readers with 
an overview of the relevant asylum and migration policies of the Czech Repu-
blic, the steps Prague has taken both domestically and on the international sce-
ne (within the Central European region, in the Western Balkans and on the EU 
3 Since 1 January 2016, these two countries alone have accounted for 31% of arrivals to Europe 
through the Mediterranean route, ibidem. 
4 Out of the 1,475 applications in 2016, 1,213 were new applications and 262 repeated applications. 
See “Statistické zprávy o mezinárodní ochraně za jednotlivé měsíce v roce 2016 [Statistical Reports 
about International Protection for the Individual Months of 2016], Ministry of Interior of the Czech 
Republic, file://C:/Users/Po%C4%8D%C3%ADta%C4%8D%20Knov%C3%ADz/Desktop/CS_stat_
prosinec_2016_1.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
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level), the impact the migration crisis has had so far on the Czech political sce-
ne (with the possible ramifications for the future) and of the general perception 
of refugees/migrants among the general public. In order to achieve this purpo-
se, the text will be divided into sub-chapters, each dealing with a specific topic 
as outlined above. At the end, general conclusions will be drawn and compari-
sons offered to other European countries.
1.2. The Czech Asylum and Migration Policies 
within the EU Framework 
(Filip Gantner, Jakub Landovský, Lenka Pítrová, Scarlett 
Waitzmanová)
In order to be able to analyse properly the migration discourse in the Czech 
Republic, the legal framework both on the national, but also on the EU le-
vel, must be at least be briefly discussed. This will provide the necessary basis 
for understanding and evaluating the Czech stance within the EU and also the 
moves Prague has made to deal with the migration crisis and their justification. 
1.2.1. The EU Asylum Policy Framework
The basis for the common visa, asylum and migration policy of the EU 
member states is the primary law of the European Union, which delineates this 
area as a shared competence of the Union and the individual member states. 
In Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hence-
forward “the Treaty”), the area of freedom, security and justice are addressed;5 
in Chapter 2 (art. 77–80) the border controls, asylum and migration are di-
scussed. The primary law thus makes a normative distinction between the asy-
lum policy and the migration policy. While these two categories (migrants and 
refugees) are often mixed in political rhetoric, the policies governing them have 
different aims and objectives. H. Scheu states that the asylum law is based on 
international obligations in the area of human rights and, indeed, on the bro-
adest definition of the term humanity itself.6 Article 78 of the Treaty makes an 
explicit reference to the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
5 For the definition of the term freedom, security and justice, see: J. Syllová, L. Pítrová, H. Paldusová et al., 
Lisabonská smlouva. Komentář [The Lisbon Treaty: Commentary], Prague 2010, pp. 348–350 (commentary 
on art. 67 par. 1 of the Treaty). For the Treaty itself, see “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union”, the European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-
a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_2&format=PDF [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
6 See H. Scheu [in:] L. Pítrová et al., Aktuální právní problémy migrace [Current Legal Migration 
Problems], Prague 2016. 
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from 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol (henceforward the “Geneva Co-
nvention”)7 and to other relevant agreements. All the EU directives regulating 
asylum policy refer to the generally accepted human rights standards. On the 
other hand, the migration law is primarily concerned with other objectives, 
such as fulfilling the security and economic goals of a state, finding a solution 
to demographic problems and/or building special relations with specific part-
ner countries. 
The Union asylum law, which the Czech legal framework is based (as di-
scussed below), thus seeks to fulfil international obligations and the high stan-
dard of human rights protection. This is true not only the secondary directives 
adopted during the first phase of the communitarisation of the asylum poli-
cy (as part of the Amsterdam novelisation of the primary law), but also for the 
new legislative framework, adopted after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force 
(new qualification directive,8 reception directive9 and the procedural directi-
ve.10 In addition to the Geneva Convention of 1951, the post-Lisbon legal do-
cuments also refer to the Charter of the Basic EU Rights (especially art. 18), 
the UN Convention on the Rights of a Child of 1989, and, related to the de-
finition of a third country, to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950.11 From the point 
of view of actual practical competence, the asylum law mainly includes the 
institute of the unified asylum status, subsidiary protection, rules for the asy-
lum proceedings and/or the Dublin system regulating the competence of the 
member states to deal with the applications for the international protection.12 
7 The Convention defines refugee as a person displaced from his homeland and having justified 
concerns about being discriminated for racial, religious or ethnic reasons, for being a part of a certain 
segment of society or for having a certain political orientation. This person is then not able to accept, 
or refuses to accept (because of the above mentioned concerns), the protection of his homeland 
(see art. 1/A.2 of the Geneva Convention of 1951, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
StatusOfRefugees.aspx [accessed: 15.02.2017]). The refugee status is however temporary – the persons 
can either receive new citizenship, or the persecution in his/her home country stops and the persons again 
accepts protection from this country.
8 DIRECTIVE 2011/95/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons 
as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible 
for subsidiary protection, and for the content of protection, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:337:0009:0026:en:PDF [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
9 DIRECTIVE 2013/33/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection [accessed: 
15.02.2017].
10 DIRECTIVE 2013/32/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0032&from=CS [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
11 See, for example, point 33 of the preamble and art. 39 par. 2 of the procedural directive. 
12 See art. 78 of the Treaty. 
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As a part of the EU migration policy, various normative acts were adopted re-
gulating, among other thigs, the conditions for legal entry to the territory 
of the member states in relation to improving the educational segment of the work-
force and competitiveness, the legal standing of the migrants and especially the me-
asures against the illegal entry and stay on the territory of the member states.13
Although it is in the area of asylum policy where the human rights obliga-
tions and their fulfilment remains the main concern, these obligations also play 
their part in the area of migration policy. One of the important institutes in 
this regard, which also connects the two policy areas together, is the institute 
of family reunion, which is based primarily on art. 8 of the European Conven-
tion about the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, and on the le-
gal opinions of the European Court for Human Rights. The Council Directive 
2003/86/ES regulating the right for the families to be reunited is then the basic 
document for granting this right to the migrants and asylees in the EU as well. 
The entire area of asylum and migration policy and the arrangements of the 
border controls is governed by the Treaty (specifically art. 80), and by the prin-
ciple of solidarity and justified division of responsibility between the member 
states. The interpretation of this principle eventually gave rise to certain contro-
versial decisions such as the relocation mechanism (see below). 
1.2.2. The Refugee Legal Framework in the Czech Republic
It has to be mentioned, as already described in the previous sub-chapter, 
that the EU asylum legal framework (within the EU Common European Asy-
lum System/CEAS) is, if we consider the minimum standard, highly harmoni-
zed and/or addressed by directly applicable normative acts, both in the perso-
nal dimension (as to how a refugee is defined) and in the procedural dimension 
(how to process the asylum application). The Czech legal system represents 
a transposition and implementation of the EU asylum law. 
The constitutional guarantee of the right to asylum in the Czech Republic is 
defined and provided mainly by art. 43 by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms of the Czech Republic. This article guarantees the right to asy-
lum only to those aliens who are persecuted for exercising their rights and fre-
edoms. Based on this article, the asylum could be denied to anyone who acted 
in disagreement with the basic human rights and freedoms. This, however, does 
not change the basic assumption that the Czech Republic is obliged to follow 
the relevant international treaty and by the above mentioned legislative measu-
res of the EU and to provide asylum in a wider spectrum of cases. 
13 See art. 79 of the Treaty.
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The basic legal provision which regulates the conditions and the procedure 
for granting an asylum in the Czech Republic is the Law no. 325/1999 Sb., on asy-
lum, as amended further (henceforth the “Law on asylum”). This law enables the 
transposition of the EU legislation and is mostly concerned with the following: 
a) the conditions for entry and for residence for the citizens of third 
countries seeking international protection by the means of asylum 
or subsidiary protection in the Czech Republic;
b) conditions for the stay of asylees or the persons enjoying the subsidia-
ry protection on the territory of the Czech Republic; 
c) the rules of the procedure for granting and removing international 
protection by the means of asylum or subsidiary protection; 
d) the rights and duties of the applicant for international protection, 
asylee and the person enjoying the subsidiary protection;
e) the rules of the integration programme; 
f ) the definition of facilities used during the asylum procedure. 
This legal measure is applied especially in the cases dealing with persons that 
have applied for international protection in the Czech Republic. The statisti-
cal data, however, shows that the number of asylum applications in the Czech 
Republic14 is minimal and if anything, the Czech Republic is considered more 
of a transit country. Most of the provisions of this law are thus not going to be 
applicable to the aliens that consider the Czech Republic only a transit coun-
try. In accordance with the European Union law, the applicant has the right 
to ask for international protection by the means of asylum or subsidiary protec-
tion in another EU member state. This would mean that the application would 
also be evaluated and considered by the other EU member state, with the sta-
te where the applicant has submitted his first application being the competent 
one. Thus, the Czech Republic could theoretically make the decision to accept 
the competence over the process of granting international protection, pursuant 
to the conditions specified in the Dublin III directive. 
The applicant for the extension of international protection is defined 
as a person that came to the Czech Republic and has asked for the extension 
of international protection. Up to the moment that a legally binding decision 
is issued by the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, this person remains 
an applicant (see some of the further remarks below). Furthermore, any alien 
that has sought the extension of international protection in another country is 
14 See ff. 4 for more information. 
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that has sought the extension of international protection in another country is 
14 See ff. 4 for more information. 
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also considered an applicant.15 The processes applied in these cases are gover-
ned by the Law on asylum. 
The applicant possesses a broad spectrum of rights and duties. His finger 
prints are taken, a digital photographic image is recorder in order to ascerta-
in or verify his/her identity, his travel documents are taken into safekeeping 
and he/she normally also has to go through a medical check-up and through 
the search of personal belongings.16
The applicant is then relocated to the “residence facility”, where he/she 
would await the decision issued by the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Repu-
blic. If the identity of the applicant could not be verified (he/she does not have 
travel documents, or if the document submitted has been forged – especially 
the first possibility is quite commonplace), the applicant could be detained 
in the so-called “reception facility” for up to 120 days in order to perform 
the necessary identity check-up.17
The applicant is entitled to stay on the territory of the Czech Republic; 
at the same time, he/she is not entitled to receive a residency permit as defined 
by the Law no. 326/1999 Sb., concerning the residence of aliens on the territo-
ry of the Czech Republic, as further amended (henceforth the “Law on aliens”). 
The Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic has the right to limit the fre-
edom of movement of the applicant for international protection a clearly deli-
neated part of the territory or even to the transit area of the airport.18
The applicant for the extension of international protection who is registe-
red to stay in an asylum facility is to be provided19 accommodation, food, the 
basic necessities for personal hygiene, per diem financial remuneration and 
the basic medical services. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior would provide 
psychological, social and other necessary services. 
As stated above, in addition to the asylum law it is necessary to also men-
tion the provision of the law on aliens. This law deals with the conditions re-
gulating the entry of aliens on the territory of the Czech Republic and their 
traveling options. When considering the applicants for the extension of inter-
national protection, it has to be mentioned that this particular law does not 
apply to persons, who are applying for an asylum or subsidiary protection as 
15 See par. 1 of the Law on asylum. 
16 See par. 45. of the Law on asylum.
17 See par. 46a of the Law on asylum.
18 See par. 3d of the Law on asylum.
19 See par. 42 of the Law on asylum. 
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defined by the Law on asylum. The Law on aliens is applicable to refugees 
in the cases when the Czech Republic is not the state competent for processing 
the application for granting the international protection (i.e. a different coun-
try is competent). In these cases, in accordance with art. 28 of the law and with 
the directives of Dublin III regarding the detention of these individuals and 
their relocation into the other EU member state are coming into effect. The 
law on aliens would also be applied if the application for asylum or subsidiary 
protection is rejected.
In these cases, the law stipulates the specific conditions under which the 
aliens are detained (normally, they would be relocated into detention facili-
ties) and relocated to the territory of other EU member states, or even to coun-
tries outside of the EU (usually the country of origin). In this regard, especially 
the Title XI of the law under question – i.e. The Special Arrangements Made 
for the Purpose of the Alien Travelling outside of the Territory and the Deten-
tion of the Alien (par. 123b–129a). The law also stipulates the conditions of the 
functioning of the detention facilities (par. 130–151).
From the procedural point of view, there is a general normative act dealing 
with administrative procedures (Law no. 500/2004 Sb., about the administra-
tive law and code), which can be applied in accordance with the principle 
of subsidiarity, both for the granting of international protection by the means 
of asylum or the subsidiary protection, and even with regards to the detention 
of aliens and their relocation according to the Law no. 326/1999 Sb., about the 
residence of aliens in the territory of the Czech Republic. Both of these laws, 
however, contain a number of deviations from the standardized legal and admi-
nistrative procedure. If we look at the judicial protection with regards to illegal 
decision on the issue of international protection, we have to take into account 
the law no. 150/2002 Sb., about the judicial procedures in the area of admini-
strative law, as modified by further legal provisions.
It could thus be concluded, based on the examples provided, that the Czech 
legal system and judicial system follows the trends of the asylum law develop-
ments leading, on the one hand, to a swifter and effective administrative pro-
cess and judicial review of the administrative decisions taken on the other, 
with the objective to guarantee the basic rights and freedoms. This is also the 
current trend of the changes and modifications proposed in the asylum law 
on the European level. 
In conclusion, while surveying the relevant Czech legislative measures, it is 
also possible mention the Law no. 221/2003 Sb., about the temporary protection 
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of aliens, as further amended. This law enabled the transposition of the Di-
rective of the European Council no. 2001/55/ES, which aims at creating 
an equilibrium between the individual EU member states. This law should 
only be applied when temporary protection is decreed by the decision of the 
Council, which has the authority to declare such a temporary protection 
in cases of massive migration waves caused by military conflicts, civil wars, na-
tural disasters etc. In addition, it is possible to mention Law no. 117/1995 Sb., 
about state social support, Law no 359/1999, about the legal and social protec-
tion of children and adolescents, Law no. 435/2004 Sb., about employment, 
Law no. 561/2004 Sb., about pre-school, elementary, middle and vocational 
schooling (the education law), Law no. 91/2012 Sb., about international private 
law, Law no. 104/2013 Sb., about international justice cooperation in criminal 
matters, or the Law no. 301/2000 Sb., about registers, names and surnames.
1.2.3. A Closer Look into the Rights and Duties of the Asylum 
Seekers and Seekers of International Protection 
Any person, who was granted an asylum in the Czech Republic (after the re-
levant decision of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic entered into 
force), is called an asylee by the legal documents applicable. Based on par. 12 
of the Law on asylum, it was established during the proceedings that the alien 
was persecuted in his country of origin. For the purposes of uniting the families, 
it is possible to also granted the asylum to the family member(s) of the asylee.20
Throughout the duration of the asylum, the asylee is entitled to permanent 
residence on the territory of the host country. The legal status of the asylee is 
governed by the asylum law and the law on aliens. Asylee thus has rights and 
duties similar to the citizens of the Czech Republic during the period under 
question, albeit with certain exceptions (the suffrage, ability to hold public of-
fice, service in the armed forces, etc.). The Ministry of Interior issues the ne-
cessary residence certificate to the asylee. By being granted an asylum, the per-
son is also entitled to become a part of the State Integration Programme21, 
which is serving the primary purpose of integrating the asylees into the society. 
As a part of this programme, free Czech classes are offered as well as assistance 
with finding housing. Participation in this programme is voluntary. 
The asylum seeker is entitled to hold employment in the Czech Republic. 
In order to be able to be employed, he/she needs a residence permit, which is 
20 Par. 2/4 of the Law on asylum states that the term persecution denotes a significant human rights 
violation and any measures that are intended to exert psychological pressure. 
21 Par. 68–70 of the Law on asylum. 
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obtained as a part of the asylum seeker status (the employment is illegal, if the 
person under question does not hold a valid residence permit22). The labour 
bureau can also assist the asylum seeker with finding adequate employment. 
In the area of employment, the asylum seekers have the same rights as the citi-
zens of the Czech Republic. 
The Ministry of Interior would turn down the appeal of an alien for inter-
national protection as evidently unjustified (§ 16 of the asylum law), if it finds 
out during the asylum evaluation procedure that: 
the applicant has only economic justification; •	
the applicant comes from a country considered safe by the Czech •	
Republic;
the applicant, without proper reasons, provided erroneous informa-•	
tion about his identity or citizenship;
the applicant uses arguments which are evidently not trustworthy; •	
the applicant has damaged or concealed his/her travel documents. •	
If the application for international protection is rejected, the alien is obli-
ged by law to leave the territory of the Czech Republic. Starting from 2015, 
the Ministry of Interior provides 400 CZK per person to cover travel expenses 
to move to another state. If the unsuccessful asylum seeker decided voluntarily 
to return to the country of origin, his/her one way airplane ticket is purchased. 
The asylum evaluation procedure could also be stopped, if the alien does not 
provide adequate cooperation during the process (does not attend the requ-
ired interviews, does not disclose information) or if he/she entered the territory 
of another country during the process or his/her location of temporary residen-
ce. As stated above, it is possible to sue the decision of the Ministry of Interior 
using the proper judicial mechanisms.
1.2.4. Conclusions: Reaction to the Migration Crisis and Its 
Reflection in the Legislation 
Since 2015, a number of the above mentioned laws and legislative measures 
were novelised, in most cases, however, these changes of rather limited technical 
/procedural nature. The most notable exception to this rule is the Law 
no. 314/2015 Sb. (henceforth the “novelised version”), which amends the law 
on asylum, law on the residence of aliens and also the law no. 221/2003 Sb., 
about granting temporary protection to aliens. As a part of the second phase of 
the building of the joint European asylum system, this newly adopted law brought 
22 For more information, see the Law no. 435/2004 Sb., on employment.
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a complex amendment to all the three mentioned laws, mainly because of the 
need to ensure transposition of the procedural and reception EU directives. 
The novelised version also reflected Dublin III in the areas of evaluation 
the competence of a given state to carry out the asylum proceedings. In ad-
dition, the novelised version also reflected the developments on the territory 
of the Czech Republic itself (e.g. making the proceedings to grant international 
protection more effective, amending the process of providing financial support 
and other benefits to those seeking international protection).
With regards to the migration crisis itself, the changes to the asylum law 
(approx. 200 changes in total) must also be taken into account, as these have an 
impact on all the stages of the asylum proceedings. New legal terms have been 
introduced (e.g. vulnerable person), a more precise definition of the already 
existent terms provided (e.g. seeker of international protection, safe country 
of origin, safe third country, persecution) and a more detailed or a complete-
ly new approach to the individual stages of the process and the institutions in-
volved delineated (e.g. repeated applications or the wider spectrum of factors 
making the application invalid/unacceptable).
In a number of areas, the relevant legislative acts have been amended as to 
be stricter from the point of view of applicant, for example by granting the le-
gal period for issuing the final decision on granting the international protection 
from the initial 90 days to six months; in especially complicated cases, this legal 
period could be further granted up to 18 months and the possibility to interrupt 
the proceedings to grant the international protection just for the time period 
when the situation in the country of origin remains unstable (it is not possible, 
however, to granted this interruption to a period longer than 21 months). 
The novelised version includes also changes of the legal framework in favo-
ur of the applicants, such as the option given to the applicants to legally work 
already 6 months after submitting the application for granting the internatio-
nal protection, as opposed to the original 12 months (the directive itself pro-
vides the possibility to set the limiting clause at 9 months), or the presence 
of the authorized person representing the applicant during an interview with 
the administrative institution(s) involved. 
One of the proposals which are seen as productive is the complex novelisa-
tion of the process of detention of the applicant for international protection 
during the asylum proceedings. The state institutions are obliged to give prece-
dence to the so-called special measures (e.g. the obligation to report in person 
to the Ministry of Interior) to the actual physical detention of the applicant 
in the reception facility or in the detention facility for aliens. The novelised ver-
sion also expands the justifications for detaining the applicant, including the 
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situations when the applicant does not provide the required cooperation and 
thus complicated the proceedings in the area of granting international protec-
tion, or in the cases when it is justified to assume that he/she represents a threat 
to national security and public order, and also when there is an imminent dan-
ger of the person to be relocated based on Dublin III escaping. Although this 
novel was not drafted as a direct or immediate reaction to the migration wave 
in 2015, the solutions proposed (within the framework of the unified EU law) 
definitely reflect the migration crisis.
At the moment, the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech 
Republic is ready to discuss a law proposed by the Government, which would 
amend the Law on the residence of aliens and other related laws. These chan-
ges are related primarily to migration coupled with employment and long-term 
residence for investments purposes. In addition, however, the Committee for 
European Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies has agreed on 15 January 2015 
(no. 115) to request the government to strengthen the security aspects inherent 
within the migration process, also in relation to the terrorist attacks in Paris in 
January 2015. The government, in reaction to this request, has proposed cer-
tain modifications within the administrative code and procedures with regards 
to the residence of aliens. The objective is to prevent the abuse of the rules now 
in place, in particular the fact that certain foreign nationals remain in the Czech 
Republic even when they do not meet the criteria for doing so. 
The other changes deal, for example, with the detention of aliens (the new 
factor here is the role of office of the state attorney in supervising the imple-
mentation of the relevant legal measures while detaining the alien in the de-
tention facility). It is also worth the time to mention the proposals leading 
to a stronger protection of classified information, which are in certain cases 
used as the main basis for issuing decisions according to the Law on aliens. 
The suggested novelised version of the law also includes several incremental 
changes to the Law on asylum, including for example the possibility to attend the 
court hearing on the extension of international protection through a video-con- 
ference. In the same manner, it should be possible to ensure that an interpreter 
is present during the proceedings. The proposed novelised version went thro-
ugh the debate in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic during the 
54. session on 11 January 2016 and it was given over to the Committee on Se-
curity for further debate. 
So far as the legal framework on the level of the EU is concerned, the Eu-
ropean Commission has made public a communication in September 2015, 
which contains the short-term and long-term measures to solve the migration 
40
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crisis.23 The ways to make the common asylum system more effective form part 
of the suggested solutions, including both the short-term measures (the so-cal-
led hot-spots, see below) or the changes to the EU legislative framework in the 
more long-term perspective.
At the moment, the evaluation of the implementation and application 
of the Dublin III directives and related measures are taking place in all the coun-
tries that apply the Dublin system in practice. The outputs of these evaluations 
should serve as one of the main background documents for the revision of the Du-
blin III directive and for the preparation of a new directive (so-called Dublin IV).
The changes should impact a whole range of areas and legislative measures. 
The current proposals count with the implementation of the so-called correc-
tive distribution mechanism (which would be applied automatically, if a coun-
try, based on the size of its territory and its wealth, would face a disproportionate 
number of asylum applications; in such a case, these applications would be for-
warded to other EU countries). If certain do not temporarily participate in this 
reallocation mechanism, they would have to pay a solidarity fee of 250,000 EUR. 
The obligation for asylum seekers to remain in the EU member state where 
they have submitted their asylum application, would be introduced. It has to 
be mentioned, however, that this proposal faces very strong criticism for being 
too rashly produced and submitted, for not being complex enough to cover the 
issues under question and for not offering comprehensive solutions. 
1.2.5. The Enhancement of the Procedure Leading to the 
Decision on Granting the Asylum and for the Judicial Review
As mentioned above, the EU legislative framework for the asylum law is 
highly harmonized and addressed by directly applicable normative acts, both 
with regards to the personal dimension (i.e., who is considered to be a refu-
gee) and to the procedural dimension (the procedures to be taken after the 
application for an asylum is lodged). The Czech legal framework presents 
a transposition and implementation of the EU asylum law and the EU laws give 
the member states very little room for manoeuvre. The differences in the le-
gal approach to the asylum law and to the asylum granting procedure cannot 
be the main reason for the decision to choose a certain country of destination 
or for its attractivity. Even then, it is still possible and even necessary to discuss 
23 Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Managing 
the Refugee Crisis: Immediate Operational, Budgetary and Legal Measures under the European 
Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 490 final (Sept. 9, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/
homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/
docs/communication_on_managing_the_refugee_crisis_en.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
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possible improvements in the area of asylum law, which could lead to better cri-
sis management procedures. From the procedural point of view it would seem 
reasonable to support such changes in the EU law which would lead to ma-
king the asylum procedure swifter and more effective. Such attempts can alre-
ady be seen in the proposals to modify the EU law as submitted by the Euro-
pean Commission24 and also from the trends which are present for a long time 
in the Czech legal system (as mentioned above). These changes concern mo-
stly the rules and the maximum period for the judicial ruling on the decision 
concerning the international protection.
1.2.6. The Relocation of Refugees 
The measures based on relocation mechanisms for the distribution of re-
fugees are in general seen as very problematic by the Czech politicians, but 
also by the experts. This concerns both the temporary relocations mechanisms25 
and the proposal to establish a permanent relocation mechanism for crisis 
situations.26 Although the Czech Republic has not openly refuted the agreement 
on these measures and has not filed a complaint to the EU Court of Justice,27 
the solidarity clause in this case is seen more in the area of financial and practi-
cal assistance in border protection and dealing with the refugee crisis. 
1.2.7. The Issue of Detentions 
The Geneva Convention of 1951 does not specifically deal with the deten-
tion of refugees. In art. 9, it simply states in case of war or other extraordina-
ry circumstances, a country could undertake specific measures towards specific 
persons, which it deems necessary for the national security.
The Dublin III directive then mentions that a person should not be detained 
just before he/she ask for international protection. If this happens anyway, the 
24 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Common Procedure for International Protection in the Union, COM (2016) 467, 13 July 2016, 
Explanatory Memorandum, 2, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2016_224 [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
25 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 Establishing Provisional Measures in the 
Area of International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and Greece, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 80, http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1601&from=EN [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
26 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, Establishing a Crisis 
Relocation Mechanism and Amending Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State 
Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member 
States by a Third Country National or a Stateless Person, COM (2015) 450 final (Sept. 9, 2015), http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015PC0450 [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
27 Unlike Slovakia, see C-643/15, Slovak Republic v. Council of the European Union (Eur. Ct. J., 
Dec. 2, 2015).
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detention should be limited to the minimum time period necessary and should 
be subject to the principles of indispensability and proportionality. When it co-
mes to the conditions of detention as specified by this directive, it is stated that 
the member states should also apply the contents of the reception directive. 
The constraints and detention of the asylum seekers in the EU is conside-
red to be problematic, as the measures associated with such an act in general 
infringe on the personal freedom as one of the fundamental human rights (see 
art. 6 of the European Convention of the Fundamental Rights 2012/C 326/02, 
where this right is guaranteed to everyone together with the personal security). 
The European Court of Justice has found, for example, in its decision in the 
case of Sélina Affum28 that the legislative acts of individual member states cannot 
decide that a citizen of third country (who has already crossed the borders of any 
EU member state illegally) and whose proceedings concerning his/her return as 
based on the so-called returns directive29 be given a prison sentence just for cros-
sing the borders illegally and for an illegal stay on the territory of the EU. 
1.2.8. Additional Crisis Management Measure
The focal point of finding solutions to the migration crisis, however, could 
probably be located in other areas than in unifying the asylum procedure and 
the conditions required for granting the international protection. Some of the-
se measures are already implemented on the European Union level, and the 
Czech Republic has supported those. Yet some others are in the competence 
of the individual member states. For the sake of providing at least some specific 
examples, the following could be listed: strengthening of the common border 
protection,30 an effective returns policy,31 prevention of the negative factors influ-
encing the refugees in the countries of origin and the related development aid.
28 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 7 June 2016, Sélina Affum v Préfet du Pas-de-Calais 
and Procureur général de la Cour d’appel de Douai, C-47/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:408, http://curia.europa.
eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=c-47/15 [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
29 DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348
:0098:0107:en:PDF [accessed: 15.02.2017].
30 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and Repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) 
No. 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, COM (2015) 671 final (Dec. 15, 2015), http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:3086c6c9-a3e7-11e5-b528-01aa75ed71a1.0023.02/
DOC_1&format=PDF [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
31 Commission Recommendation Establishing a Common “Return Handbook” to be Used by 
Member States’ Competent Authorities When Carrying out Return Related Tasks, COM (2015) 6250 
final (Oct. 1, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/
european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/commission_recommendation_
45
1.2.9. Current Legal Problems and the Possible Way Ahead 
The current legal problems related to the procedural aspects of migration 
to the EU countries are caused by a number of factors. It is obvious that the 
approach of some of the EU member states is not adequate to the complexi-
ty and massiveness of the problem currently at hand, and also with regards to 
the future. It also needs to be taken into account that certain member states 
do not fulfil the obligations that stem from the Dublin system, which makes 
the entire system much less predictable and creates a feeling of uncertainty. 
The practical application of the legal framework and norms is further compli-
cated by the commentaries and the implementation procedures of the Conven-
tion on the Legal Position of the Refugees and the European Convention on 
the Protection of Human Rights in the individual member states, which are far 
from being unified and consistent. The EU is further complicating the matters 
by continually supporting the standard asylum procedure, which puts a strain 
on the institutions carrying it out in terms of time consumption, financial re-
sources and the sheer bureaucracy needed to carry out properly. This often lead 
to the extension of asylum or supplementary protection, which turn out to be 
a permanent status in nature. At the moment, one possibility from the legal 
point of view seems to the activation of the temporary protection (EC Directi-
ve 2001/55/ES) for persons already located on the EU territory, coupled with 
a stronger emphasis placed on the cooperation with the third countries in the 
process of returning those migrants who did not qualify for the international 
protection on the EU territory.
1.3. Integration Policies and Programmes of the Czech 
Government – Key Documents and Responsible 
Institutions 
(Filip Gantner, Jakub Landovský, Lenka Pítrová, Scarlett 
Waitzmanová) 
As discussed above, the asylum and migration policy are a firm part of the 
overall EU legal framework. Their implementation, however, varies country by 
country, as does the general attitude towards migrants/refugees. The following 
establishing_a_return_handbook_for_member_states_competent_authorities_to_deal_with_return_
related_tasks_en.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
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chapter deals with the steps taken by the Czech government to ensure the in-
clusiveness of society and the various programmes that it has developed with 
regards to refugees. 
1.3.1. The Basic Principles of the Czech Migration and 
Integration Policy 
The Czech Republic is well aware of the fact that migration is a natural and 
permanent historical phenomenon, which creates new opportunities for both 
the migrant and the country of destination, but also for the country of origin. 
International trade, foreign investments, study abroad, international scholar-
ships and exchange programmes, highly skilled foreign experts and workers 
– all these facets and aspects of migration. Any significant limitations or even 
a completely shut-down of migration would be a blow to the economy and to 
the competitiveness of the given country, but it would also have an impact on 
the freedom of movement of its own citizens. In the light of this, the Czech 
Republic’s migration policy has the long-term objective to make the migration 
a success story by regulating its flows and also by providing the necessary tools 
to integrate the migrants/refugees into the society.32
 
In addition to the laws and legal measures described in the previous chapter, 
there are some key conceptual and strategic documents which should be men-
tioned here. The basic strategic framework for migration policy is provided by 
the document “Strategie migrační politiky ČR [Strategy of the Czech Migra-
tion Policy]”33 from 2015. The primary goal of this strategy is to define a bal-
anced a flexible migration policy for the Czech Republic, including the guid-
ing principles, objectives and tools. The migration strategy should strengthen 
the positive aspects of migration while eliminating or weakening the negative 
aspects, impacts and risks. The strategy defines seven priorities – integration, 
illegal migration and returns policy, asylum procedure, the external dimen-
sion of migration policy, freedom of movement within the EU and Schengen 
cooperation, legal migration, and the international and European obligations 
of the Czech Republic in the area of migration. It could thus be said that it covers 
all the key aspects of migration and is a useful tool for formulating and imple-
menting the migration policy. 
32 See for example the document “Audit národní bezpečnosti [National Security Audit]”, drafted 
and released to the public in December 2016, especially pp. 62–74 (chapter on the security aspects 
of migration), https://www.vlada.cz/assets/media-centrum/aktualne/Audit-narodni-bezpecnosti-201612 
01.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
33 See “Strategie migracni politiky CR”, Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, http://www.mvcr.
cz/clanek/strategie-migracni-politiky-cr.aspx [accessed 15.02.2017]. 
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From the point of view of integration of foreigners the Czech Republic has 
a novelised document called “Koncepce integrace cizinců [Foreigner Integra-
tion Concept]”.34 This document was updated in 2016 under the new title 
“In Mutual Respect”. The institutions mainly responsible for the implementa-
tion of the concept are the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare, and the Ministry of Education. The concept reflects the current situ-
ation and the needs within the integration process for all the foreigners living 
on the territory of the Czech Republic. It also analyses the current state of affa-
irs with regards to migration. The concept represents a reaction to the current 
developments and it brings a number of new measures and changes. The target 
group of the document, in addition to the foreigners from third countries and 
the EU who are in some sort of a difficult situation, are now also the asylees 
and asylum seekers. The goal of the document is to strengthen the public trust 
through new communication strategy, which makes it possible to share infor-
mation concerning migration and integration with the public and to enrich the 
public discourse on the topic. 
The integration policy in the Czech Republic thus focuses on creating 
a complex system of integrated care for foreigners. The priority is to streng-
then the overall awareness of the foreigners concerning their rights and duties. 
Based on the documents mentioned above, classes are offered to migrants to 
assist them with the initial orientation and adaptation and also with learning 
the language. The integration measures are also implemented by the regional 
and local administration, especially through the expanding network of regio-
nal Centres for the Integration of Foreigners and through integration projects 
of individual communities. The concept also counts on the continued coopera-
tion with NGOs and with supporting own activities of the foreigners. 
In 2015, a new “Státní integrační program [State Integration Programme 
– SIP]”,35 which focuses on assisting persons that have been granted the in-
ternational protection with their integration into the society. The guiding 
principles included in the SIP provide a detailed description of the process 
of integration including the necessary financial resources and their oversight. 
SIP focuses on three basic areas of integration assistance: teaching the Czech 
language, entry into the labour market (including the necessary requalification 
34 See “Koncepce integrace cizincu”, http://www.mpsv.cz/files/clanky/25571/Priloha_c._2_Aktua 
lizovana_Koncepce_integrace_cizincu_ve_vzajemnem_respektu_a_Postup_pri_realizaci_aktualizovane_
Koncepce_integrace_cizincu_v_roce_2016.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017].
35 See “Statni integracni program”, http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/integrace.aspx?q=Y2hudW09Mg% 
3D%3D [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
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principles included in the SIP provide a detailed description of the process 
of integration including the necessary financial resources and their oversight. 
SIP focuses on three basic areas of integration assistance: teaching the Czech 
language, entry into the labour market (including the necessary requalification 
34 See “Koncepce integrace cizincu”, http://www.mpsv.cz/files/clanky/25571/Priloha_c._2_Aktua 
lizovana_Koncepce_integrace_cizincu_ve_vzajemnem_respektu_a_Postup_pri_realizaci_aktualizovane_
Koncepce_integrace_cizincu_v_roce_2016.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017].
35 See “Statni integracni program”, http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/integrace.aspx?q=Y2hudW09Mg% 
3D%3D [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
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overseen by the Ministry of labour) and assistance with finding housing (over-
seen by the Ministry of Interior) – the housing assistance could have two forms: 
1) the renting of apartments owned by the local administration and giving 
the administration a one-time financial assistance; 2) the renting of privately 
owned apartments with the government paying part of the rent to the owner. 
SIP also assists people with physical disabilities and older people with financing 
their stay in social care facilities. SIP also includes legal and social counselling, 
the possibility to stay for a limited period of time in the integration asylum 
centres of the Ministry of Interior, provision of basic education to children,36 
etc. SIP was drafted and approved based on the request of the government fol-
lowing a decision made on 8 July 2015 to voluntarily accept 400 persons from 
outside of the EU within the period of two years (July 2015 – June 2017) and 
further 1,100 persons to be resettled from Italy and Greece. On 22 September 
2015, the Justice and Home Affairs Council gave the Czech Republic the obli-
gation to accept 1,591 additional migrants from Italy and Greece.37
In its migration policy strategy, the Czech Republic has pledged to fulfil its 
obligation to ensure that its citizens will have a peaceful coexistence with the 
foreigners who are being integrated and that this integration will eliminate ne-
gative social impacts of migration. It also promised to provide security to the 
citizens and to ensure effective law enforcement in the area of illegal migra-
tion, returns policy and organized crime connected to human trafficking and 
smuggling. The Czech Republic also pledged to fulfil its obligations regarding 
granting asylums and that it will make its system more flexible and enhance 
activities with the purpose helping the refugees abroad in order to curb the mi-
gration flows. The Czech Republic will insist on maintaining the advantages 
stemming from the freedom of movement within the EU and in the Schengen 
Area and it will also focus on supporting legal migration, which brings benefits 
to both the country and its citizens.38
In 2016, approximately 54 mil. CZK were allocated from the state budget 
to support the integration of migrants. In addition, the individual ministries 
are allocating additional resources to support integration. For example, the 
Ministry of Interior could be mentioned with the earmarked sum of approx. 
40 mil. CZK, or the Ministry of Education with 13 mil. CZK. 
 
The migration is a multidimensional phenomenon and this is clearly re-
flected in the number of state institutions involved in reacting to it and coop-
36 Office of the Government of the Czech Republic.
37 Office of the Government of the Czech Republic and Ministry of Interior. 
38 See “Strategie migracni politiky CR”, Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, http://www.mvcr.
cz/clanek/strategie-migracni-politiky-cr.aspx [accessed: 15.02.2017].
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erating on intra-governmental basis. Already in December 2006, the Ministry 
of Interior has established under its auspices the Coordination Institution 
for the Management of State Border Protection and Migration (henceforth 
the “Coordination Institution”). The members of the Coordination Institution 
are the deputy ministers of foreign affairs, industry and trade, labour and social 
welfare, education, defence, local development, finance, justice and healthcare. 
The other members include the police president, the deputy minister for human 
rights, equal opportunities and legislation, the deputy prime minister for science, 
research and innovation, and the government secretary for European affairs. 
As a follow-up to the adoption of the migration policy strategy and of the 
communication strategy on migration and based on the decision made by 
the Czech government on 12 October 2015, the Coordination Institution also 
meets on the level of ministers. The division of individual competencies and 
portfolios is described in “Zpráva o situaci v oblasti migrace a integrace cizinců 
na území ČR [Report on the Situation in the Area of Migration and Integra-
tion of Foreigners on the Territory of the Czech Republic]”.39 The ministries 
are, to a certain extent, involved within the security framework of the migra-
tion policy, with the individual portfolios being as follows: 
Office of the Government of the Czech Republic – coordination •	
of the public governance, human rights, European affairs; 
Ministry of Interior – coordination of the asylum and migration policy with •	
border protection, coordination of integration policy, crisis management; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – development aid and humanitarian assi-•	
stance, issuing of temporary Schengen visa, visa and consular agenda; 
Ministry of Defence – defence of the Czech Republic in coordination •	
with armed forces of other countries;
Ministry of Industry and Trade – commercial activities of foreigners;•	
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare – employment and social secu-•	
rity of foreigners, integration on the labour market;
Ministry of Education – education and integration of foreigners •	
in the pre-school, elementary, middle, vocational and university edu-
cation systems;
Ministry of Finance – allocation of financial resources, duties and •	
customs, persecution of illegal employment;
Ministry of Justice – legislative measures in criminal law, extraditions •	
and expulsions; 
39 This report is drafted annually based on the decision of the government no. 467/1993 and the de- 
cision issued by the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament no. 225 (12 October 1993) and the subsequent 
decision of the Chamber of Deputies no. 716 (28 June 1995). 
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Ministry of Transportation – civilian aviation;•	
Ministry of Healthcare – protection of public health;•	
Ministry for Regional Development – regional policies.•	
Within the security framework, obviously the intelligence services are also 
included, based on their competence as given by the relevant laws, and in line 
with priorities that are set yearly by the government. 
1.3.2. The Humanitarian and Development Aid in the 
Migration Context 
The Czech Republic is aware of the push and pull factors regarding migra-
tion. The push factors (security, economic, natural, etc.), are everything that 
influences a person in his home country and which bolsters his/her decision 
to leave. The Czech Republic is convinced that the EU must be very active 
in this regard, as well as the regional groupings (for example the Visegrad Group) 
and the individual states including the Czech Republic itself. Thus, the Czech 
Republic is very active in using the tools to prevent migration from the co-
untries of origin by various specialized support programmes. For example, 
it is possible to mention the activities of the Czech Republic in negotiating the 
migration compacts with third countries, as presented by the European Com-
mission in Cooperation with EEAS as a part of the new framework for part-
nership with third countries.40 The Czech Republic actively contributes to the 
Trust Fund for Africa and the Trust Fund for the Middle East and Western Bal-
kans (MADAD). At the same time, the Czech Republic also financially sup-
ports the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
The tools on the national level included the foreign development aid, hu-
manitarian aid and specialized programmes such as the programme of the Mi-
nistry of Interior to assist the refugees in their countries/regions of origin and 
to prevent larger migration waves in 2016 or conceptual document of the Mi-
nistry of Interior aiming at assisting refugees and states under strong migrant 
pressure (for 2016, a total amount of 150 mil. CZK was allocated for these 
purposes).41 In reaction to the armed clashes in the city of Aleppo in Syria and 
in its vicinity at the end of 2015 and in the beginning of 2016, when another 
40 See “Migration Partnership Framework: A New Approach to Better Manage Migration”, European 
Commission, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_frame 
work_update_2.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
41 See “Program Ministerstva vnitra na asistenci uprchlíkům v regionech původu a prevenci velkých 
migračních pohybů v roce 2016”, Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/
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migration wave was set into motion, the Czech Republic has approved and pro-
vided a one-time immediate financial gift to the Turkish government, specifi-
cally to the Office for the Management of Disasters and Emergencies (AFAD) 
of 15 mil. CZK. These resources were earmarked for the assistance to the Syrian 
refugees coming from the Aleppo area.42
The need to expand the assistance provided to the EU countries and to the 
countries in the neighbourhood of the EU which became transit countries and 
had to face a lot of pressure due to the ongoing migration crisis became evident 
in the spring of 2016. Based on the outputs of the European Council which 
met in March 2016 (see Chapter IV), the Czech Republic has decided to esta-
blish a programme of the Ministry of Interior for the support of the EU mem-
ber states and countries in the EU neighbourhood facing significant migration 
pressures. The goal of these programmes was to support those member states 
whose asylum and migration systems were put under extreme pressure.43
On the other hand, pull factors include all the individual aspects that are 
attracting the migrant to the country of destination, such as the social bene-
fits, affordable and efficient health care, the attitude of the society to migration, 
the willingness of the majority to tolerate illegal migration, the size of the com-
munity already settled in the destination country, loopholes in the administra-
tive procedures on asylum etc. The size of the diaspora, together with the means 
to find employment or start a career, are an important pull factor for a number 
of illegal migrants.
1.4. The Perception of Migrants/Refugees in the Czech 
Republic and the Impact of the Migration Crisis on the 
Czech Political Scene 
(Jan Bečka, Bohumil Doboš, Martin Riegl, Scarlett Waitzmanová)
So far, this article has been dealing primarily with the legal framework, 
especially with the approach to migration on the EU level and the mutual har-
monization of the EU policies and legal acts with those of the Czech Repub-
lic. While the legal framework is extremely important from the point of view 
financni-podpora-do-zahranici-migracni-krize.aspx?q=Y2hudW09Mg%3d%3d [accessed: 15.02.2017]; 
see e.g. http://www.mvcr.cz/docDetail.aspx?docid=21992698 [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
42 Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic. 
43 Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and 
Office of the Government. 
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Office of the Government. 
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of providing the necessary level of legal protection and support for the refugees 
/migrants, it is only a part of the puzzle. As mentioned in the introduction, 
migration has been “securitized” and it is thus no longer “just” a legal question, 
but an important topic of the national political and societal discourse as well. 
In this sub-chapter, the public perception of migration/migrants/refugees will 
be analysed as well as the impact on the Czech politics. 
1.4.1. The Perception of Migrants/Refugees among the General 
Public in the Czech Republic 
As mentioned earlier, despite the fact that the Czech Republic is neither 
a destination for the refugees/migrants nor does it serve as a major transit coun-
try, the issue of migration is felt and discussed very intensively by at least some 
segments of the Czech society. Here, some statistic and public opinion polls are 
necessary to substantiate the claims made above. 
According to an opinion poll/survey conducted by the Czech Institute 
of Sociology in early 2016, 61% of the respondents polled expressed the opi-
nion that the Czech Republic should not be receiving any refugees, even from 
war-torn countries – even more staggering is the fact that among the rest 
of the respondents who would welcome the refugees under certain conditions, 
only 3% would allow them to settle in the Czech Republic on more than just 
temporary basis and to become a part of the society; there are actually signifi-
cant differences in how the Czech society views the refugees from different parts 
of the world – 40% of those polled would accept refugees from Ukraine, while only 
16% would accept those from the Middle East and Africa (with 78% against).44
The numbers are obviously constant and not liable to major changes. 
In another poll conducted in December 2016, 64% of those polled were against 
any refugees/migrants being accepted by the Czech Republic, while 30% would 
accept them on temporary basis only.45 In February 2017, in an opinion poll con-
ducted on the threats felt by the population, 31% of those interviewed responded 
that they see migration as one of the major threats (coupled with terrorism).46
44 Sociologický ústav AVČR, “Postoj české společnosti k přijímání uprchlíků, únor 2016”, http://cvvm.
soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c1/a7531/f3/pm160329.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
45 Sociologický ústav AVČR (Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění), “Postoj české společnosti 
k přijímání uprchlíků, prosinec 2016”, http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c1/
a7644/f3/pm170113.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
46 “Obavy Čechů jsou nejnižší za posledních 15 let, třetina se bojí uprchlíků”, idnes.cz, http://zpravy.
idnes.cz/pruzkum-cvvm-cesi-obavy-migrace-uprchlici-fiv-/domaci.aspx?c=A170209_131505_domaci_
san [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
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It has to be mentioned that when considering the perception of refugees 
in the Czech Republic, we are often dealing with the “fear of the unknown” 
and that very few people actually have a first hand experience with the ref-
ugees, especially those from predominantly Islamic countries of the Middle 
East and North Africa. To a certain degree, the refusal to accept the presence 
of the refugees “personally”, i.e. to live near to them and to take them as a part 
of the everyday space that an individual encounters, could be from the psycho-
logical and sociological perspective compared to a similar refusal to, for exam-
ple, have a storage facility for used nuclear fuel close to one’s home or within 
the community where one lives in general. It could be also argued that this is 
the classic example of the NYMB (Not in My Backyard) syndrome, where the 
fear of the unknown and of the change (and the possible negatives the change 
would bring with it) overweighs the considerations based on the feelings 
of humanity and solidarity, which are often felt by the majority of society. This 
seems to be the case in many places in the Czech Republic, for example in the 
town of Kraliky, where the locals have been very strongly against opening a re-
ception facility for migrants during the recent migration crisis, and also on the 
Czech-German border near the village of Moldava, where the sheer presence 
of migrants on the other (German) side of the border created a public outrage 
despite the fact that no incidents occurred. In both of these cases, the issues 
were strongly medialized and not only the local population but also politicians 
on both the local and the national level expressed their doubts about welcom-
ing the migrants.47
Where is this highly sceptical attitude towards the refugees/migrants com-
ing from when, as was already mentioned several times in this case-study, very 
few people have a direct, first-hand negative (or, for that matter, positive) expe-
rience with people coming from the Middle East or Africa? It would be easy to 
simply brand the Czech as racists and xenophobes, but the data that are avail-
able do not justify such a simple conclusion. 
In the following sub-chapter, attention will be paid mostly to how the is-
sue of migration crisis has been picked up by the politicians both on extreme 
poles of the political spectrum, but also from the mainstream parties. This has 
been important in shaping the public opinion but also the political discourse 
on both the national and international level, as the refugees are often associ-
ated with terrorism and security risks and one of the prevalent factors in this 
debate is thus fear. 
47 T. Lokšová, “Nepřítomní uprchlíci: Mediální obraz dění v Králíkách a na Moldavě” [The Refugees 
Who Are Not There: The Media Portrayal of the Events in Kraliky and in Moldava], http://migraceonline.
cz/doc/Nepritomni_uprchlici.pdf [accessed: 15.02.2017].
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ception facility for migrants during the recent migration crisis, and also on the 
Czech-German border near the village of Moldava, where the sheer presence 
of migrants on the other (German) side of the border created a public outrage 
despite the fact that no incidents occurred. In both of these cases, the issues 
were strongly medialized and not only the local population but also politicians 
on both the local and the national level expressed their doubts about welcom-
ing the migrants.47
Where is this highly sceptical attitude towards the refugees/migrants com-
ing from when, as was already mentioned several times in this case-study, very 
few people have a direct, first-hand negative (or, for that matter, positive) expe-
rience with people coming from the Middle East or Africa? It would be easy to 
simply brand the Czech as racists and xenophobes, but the data that are avail-
able do not justify such a simple conclusion. 
In the following sub-chapter, attention will be paid mostly to how the is-
sue of migration crisis has been picked up by the politicians both on extreme 
poles of the political spectrum, but also from the mainstream parties. This has 
been important in shaping the public opinion but also the political discourse 
on both the national and international level, as the refugees are often associ-
ated with terrorism and security risks and one of the prevalent factors in this 
debate is thus fear. 
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The Czech Republic is considered one of the most Eurosceptic countries 
in Europe and this tendency has been rather on the rise. According to a survey 
taken in April/May 2016, during the time when the migration crisis was in full 
swing, only 25% of those polled declared they are happy with the EU mem-
bership (3% very happy/very satisfied, 22% more or less happy/satisfied), whi-
le 36% were either dissatisfied or extremely unhappy.49 Criticizing and bashing 
the European Union for both real and imagined mistakes and “infringements” 
on the freedom and rights of the national states and even individuals has thus 
become a sort of favourite national past-time activity (especially in certain seg-
ments of the society) and it would indeed be strange if the pattern was not fol-
lowed by certain politicians vying for the public support. 
As the graph on the previous page shows, there is a correlation in the minds 
of the public between the migration crisis and the (in)ability of the EU to more 
effectively stem the migration flows. Again, as argued above, it is then natu-
ral that even mainstream politicians will follow the trend and will use similar, 
if not the same arguments in order to please the public. One of the most out-
spoken mainstream politicians in the Czech Republic who regularly makes re-
marks concerning migrants and migration and who criticizes the EU is the 
President Milos Zeman. As an example, we could use his “Christmas Address” 
to the nation, broadcasted on 26 December 2016. In his address, Zeman, 
among other things, stated: “To place Muslim migrants difficult to integrate 
on our territory would be to create the conditions for possible terrorist attacks, 
which I would want to warn very seriously against.”50 Earlier, in October 2016, 
Zeman said that the economic refugees should be “deported into empty spots 
/wastelands in North Africa or Greece.”51 This statement provoked a reaction 
from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lubomir Zaoralek, who said that Zeman’s 
words do not represent the official position of the Czech Republic. It can be ar-
gued that Zeman, even though in the past he was already known for controversial 
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statements about a number of issues, is trying to cater to the public opinion, 
especially with the presidential elections (in which he would likely stand for re-
election) coming up in 2018. At the same time, given the president’s relatively 
high and stable popularity (in March 2016, during the migration crisis, he had 
the approval rating of 63% of those polled52), the question is whether migra-
tion is indeed a topic he needs to embark upon. 
Overall, the coalition government which has been in power since January 
2017, has been able to hold a relatively consistent line on the migration crisis. 
While certain politicians, such as the Minister of Interior Milan Chovanec53 
and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Andrej Babiš54 have 
perhaps began more vocal on the topic than some others, the government has 
been able to communicate the same message on the various levels when meeting 
with the representatives of the other EU member states and of the partner co-
untries (see Chapter IV for more details on these negotiations and on the stance 
of the Czech Republic and other V4 countries with regards to migration). 
So far, the political statements and actions of the mainstream politicians 
and representatives of the political institutions were discussed. It has to be kept 
in mind, however, that the above mentioned rise of populism in Europe also 
gave rise to a number of more or less obscure political movements that have an-
ti-migration policy and anti-Islamism as their main agenda. In this regard, the 
name Martin Konvicka, lecturer at the South Bohemian University and a co-
founder of several of these platforms should definitely be mentioned. Konvicka 
profiles himself as the defender of “traditional values”, “traditional Europe”, etc. 
At certain points, especially during the height of the migration crisis, it seemed 
that his political initiatives and he personally had a reasonable chance to pass 
the threshold for being elected into the Parliament. Like with most of the po-
pulist movements based on one or two single topics, however, it now seems that 
the initial popular support has petered out as the migration crisis begun to we-
52 “Approval Ratings of Leading Political Personalities and Institution”, Stem, 8 March 2016, https://
www.stem.cz/podil-lidi-duverujicich-vlade-poslanecke-snemovne-a-senatu-se-v-porovnani-se-situaci-
pred-rokem-mirne-snizil/ [accessed: 14.01.2017]. 
53 Milan Chovanec commented for the media for example the case of the group of Iraqi asylum 
seekers that were accepted to the Czech Republic, but soon most of them travelled to Germany and later 
to Iraq. Chovanec was strongly critical to this particular project of asylym seekers and ordered it halted. 
See for example: http://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/domaci/chovanec-iracti-uprchlici-dodnes-se-pretahujeme-
s-nemci_414652.html [accessed: 14.01.2017]; http://zpravy.idnes.cz/chovanec-zastavil-projekt-generace-
21-dvy-/domaci.aspx?c=A160401_154722_domaci_san [accessed: 14.01.2017]. 
54 Babis is very strongly against receiving migrants, especially through the permanent relocation 
mechanism, and stated on several occasions that he is ready to risk even sanctions. See for example: https://
www.novinky.cz/domaci/410309-babis-s-prijimanim-jakychkoliv-uprchliku-nesouhlasim.html [accessed: 
14.01.2017]; https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/410926-babis-chci-kvoty-na-uprchliky-odmitnout-i-za-ce 
nu-sankci.html [accessed: 14.01.2017]; http://www.blesk.cz/clanek/zpravy-politika/410709/babis-kvoty-
respektovat-nebudu-at-se-kvuli-uprchlikum-sejde-snemovna.html [accessed: 14.01.2017]. 
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aken. In elections to the Senate in October 2016, Konvicka only received 8% 
of the vote in his electoral district, finishing next to last.55 According to the la-
test opinion polls, his political party is nowhere near meeting the 5% threshold 
needed to enter the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament.
Figure 1.2
Public Preferences by Political Party, January 2017
Source: “Public Opinion Poll – Party Preferences“, SANEP, 18 January 2017, http://
www.sanep.cz/pruzkumy/volebni-preference-leden-2017-publikovano-18-1-2017/ [accessed: 
15.02.2017].
The other example of a nationalist/populist movement that has lately 
focused largely on migration and anti-Islamism is the Úsvit [Dawn] party 
of Tomio Okamura, which has managed to enter the Parliament in the last 
elections. Okamura has always used populist topics (direct democracy, reform 
55 For the full information on the election results, see e.g. http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/politika/
politici-volicum/Vysledky-voleb-do-Senatu-TABOR-obvod-13-457314 [accessed: 14.01.2017]. 
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of the social welfare system in favour of the “normal people”, struggle against 
“corrupt politicians”.) In 2015 and 2016, however, his main agenda started 
to become the migration crisis. Okamura repeatedly stated56 that there are 
no refugees, just migrants seeking economic benefits and better life in Europe. 
He also stated that they represent a danger to the European way of life, to na-
tional security and to public health. Yet, once more, in the latest election polls 
his party is well below the necessary threshold. 
What conclusions could be drawn concerning the Czech electorate and the 
populist (mis)use of the migration crisis? It would seem that the migration 
crisis is not such a large topic after all, especially given the fact that there are 
almost no refugees in the Czech Republic at the moment and thus they 
are not threatening anyone or taking anyone’s job away (referring to the mi-
grants coming from the Middle East and Africa). Some of the mainstream par-
ties (or at least their politicians) have also made a number of populist statements 
regarding the migrants, but their parties do not depend on these topics – after 
all, improvements to the tax, healthcare and social welfare system, which only 
the established parties could realistically offer, are much more important for 
the electorate than a fight against threat, which is at the moment present only 
in the media. Should the situation change in the future and the Czech Repub-
lic become a destination country with all the possible positive and negative im-
pacts associated with this change, then the migration issue might play a bigger 
role in shaping the results of the elections. At the moment, however, especially 
when the migration crisis seems to recede, its lasting to mid-term impact on the 
Czech political scene can be seen as rather limited. 
1.5. The Czech Republic and the Reactions to the 
Migration Crisis on the International Scene 
(Bohumil Doboš, Jakub Landovský, Martin Riegl, Scarlett 
Waitzmanová)
As discussed above, the Czech discourse on migration has been often shaped 
by fear of the refugees and by the opposition to the attempts of the European 
Union and some countries, notably Germany, to force the other EU countries 
to become more active and to show more solidarity. Does this, however, mean 
56 See for example: http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/politika/politici-volicum/Okamura-Nepouzivejte-
termin-uprchlici-jsou-to-ilegalni-tedy-nezakonni-imigranti-421558 [accessed: 14.01.2017]; http://www.
parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/monitor/Okamurova-mraziva-vypoved-o-navsteve-uprchliku-Hrozi-vam-
nasili-okradeni-nebo-nakaza-39704 [accessed: 14.01.2017], 
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that Prague has been entirely passive and intransigent in the meetings on the 
EU level, or has it attempted to pursue an agenda of its own? And if so, how 
successful has been it so far? 
The following chapter deals how the Czech Republic attempted to use its 
presidency in the Visegrad Group (V4) in 2016 to shape the refugee agenda 
on the European level, and also what practical steps it suggested the EU should 
take. While it was often criticized for not showing solidarity with the countries 
worst hit by the crisis, it will be seen that it has actually done quite a lot in the-
ir support. On the other hand, it has not been willing to agree with such steps 
on the European level which it sees as either erroneous or infringing on the 
freedoms of the individual states. 
1.5.1. The Visegrad Group (V4), the Czech Presidency and Its 
Activities on the EU Level
The Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group (from now V4) came at a time 
(1 July 2015 – 30 June 2016) of immensely turbulent developments in the area 
of international affairs and foreign policy. The period under question thus pre-
sented many challenges not only for the Czech Republic, but for all the mem-
ber states of the European Union and also for the countries in the Western 
Balkans. The issue of migration inevitably became a major factor of influence 
of the Czech V4 Presidency, reflecting both the need to resolve the crisis on the 
international level and the need to assuage the fears of the domestic population 
in the V4 countries. The activities planned initially to be carried out within 
the framework of the Visegrad cooperation gradually lost priority because 
of the pressing need to find ad hoc solutions to the ongoing situation. In parti-
cular, it was necessary to allocate adequate resources for resolving the so-called 
migration crisis. One of the important aspects of the Czech Presidency was thus 
the coordination of the individual positions of the V4 countries prior 
to the meetings of the European Council (from now on the Council) as well as 
the meetings of other EU institutions (Foreign Affairs Council – FAC, General 
Affairs Council – GAC, Justice and Home Affairs Council – JHA, etc.). This 
coordination, carried out on regular basis especially before the meetings on the 
European level, helped to formulate and present a coherent and well-argued 
position of the V4 countries regarding the migration-relevant agendas of the 
EU. It should be noted that on the issue of illegal migration and of the percep-
tion of the intrinsic significance of the migration agenda there was a general 
agreement between the top-level political institutions in the Czech Republic 
from the outset of the crisis. 
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56 See for example: http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/politika/politici-volicum/Okamura-Nepouzivejte-
termin-uprchlici-jsou-to-ilegalni-tedy-nezakonni-imigranti-421558 [accessed: 14.01.2017]; http://www.
parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/monitor/Okamurova-mraziva-vypoved-o-navsteve-uprchliku-Hrozi-vam-
nasili-okradeni-nebo-nakaza-39704 [accessed: 14.01.2017], 
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that Prague has been entirely passive and intransigent in the meetings on the 
EU level, or has it attempted to pursue an agenda of its own? And if so, how 
successful has been it so far? 
The following chapter deals how the Czech Republic attempted to use its 
presidency in the Visegrad Group (V4) in 2016 to shape the refugee agenda 
on the European level, and also what practical steps it suggested the EU should 
take. While it was often criticized for not showing solidarity with the countries 
worst hit by the crisis, it will be seen that it has actually done quite a lot in the-
ir support. On the other hand, it has not been willing to agree with such steps 
on the European level which it sees as either erroneous or infringing on the 
freedoms of the individual states. 
1.5.1. The Visegrad Group (V4), the Czech Presidency and Its 
Activities on the EU Level
The Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group (from now V4) came at a time 
(1 July 2015 – 30 June 2016) of immensely turbulent developments in the area 
of international affairs and foreign policy. The period under question thus pre-
sented many challenges not only for the Czech Republic, but for all the mem-
ber states of the European Union and also for the countries in the Western 
Balkans. The issue of migration inevitably became a major factor of influence 
of the Czech V4 Presidency, reflecting both the need to resolve the crisis on the 
international level and the need to assuage the fears of the domestic population 
in the V4 countries. The activities planned initially to be carried out within 
the framework of the Visegrad cooperation gradually lost priority because 
of the pressing need to find ad hoc solutions to the ongoing situation. In parti-
cular, it was necessary to allocate adequate resources for resolving the so-called 
migration crisis. One of the important aspects of the Czech Presidency was thus 
the coordination of the individual positions of the V4 countries prior 
to the meetings of the European Council (from now on the Council) as well as 
the meetings of other EU institutions (Foreign Affairs Council – FAC, General 
Affairs Council – GAC, Justice and Home Affairs Council – JHA, etc.). This 
coordination, carried out on regular basis especially before the meetings on the 
European level, helped to formulate and present a coherent and well-argued 
position of the V4 countries regarding the migration-relevant agendas of the 
EU. It should be noted that on the issue of illegal migration and of the percep-
tion of the intrinsic significance of the migration agenda there was a general 
agreement between the top-level political institutions in the Czech Republic 
from the outset of the crisis. 
60
Within the framework of its V4 Presidency, the Czech Republic has organi-
zed four summits of the V4 prime ministers to deal with the issue of migration. 
The same agenda was also dealt with by two joints meetings of foreign mini-
sters of the V4 countries, Luxembourg and Germany. All the m0eetings of V4 
foreign ministers tackled this problem as well.57
Already by 4 September 2015, an extraordinary summit of the V4 was or-
ganized to deal solely with the issue migration. During the summit, a joint sta-
tement of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group regarding migration was 
adopted. Among other things, the V4 countries declared their full solidarity with 
Hungary, which was at the time dealing with an unprecedented migration pres-
sure, to cope with the challenge. It was also stated that the other V4 countries are 
ready to provide even more aid to Hungary as an expression of their solidarity. 
Subsequently, on 11 September 2015, a meeting of foreign ministers of the 
V4 countries, Luxembourg and Germany took place in Prague, with the main 
topic being once migration. The ministers have agreed on the need of a joint 
Union position and of solidarity between the individual EU member states 
while stressing the need for finding solutions to the root causes of migration. 
They have expressed their support for the Council proposal to compile a list 
of safe countries of origin and also the proposal to establish a trust fund to 
help the African countries. They have also agreed that it was necessary to assist 
the transit countries with the reception and registration of migrants. On the 
other hand, there was a continued disagreement concerning the proposed re-
distribution mechanism and the very fact that a permanent mechanism should 
be implemented to redistribute the migrants among the EU member states. 
The main output of the working lunch was a joint V4 communiqué which fo-
cused on the migration route through the Western Balkans, stabilization of the 
countries in the European neighbourhood, fight against human smugglers and 
traffickers, development and humanitarian aid, international cooperation be-
tween the UN, the African Union and the League of Arab states and on the 
further organization of conferences focusing on migration.58
The issues related with migration were also discussed at an extraordinary 
meeting of the V4 defence ministers, which took place on 17 December 2015 
in Prague. On the top of the agenda were the refugee crisis, the security situ-
57 For more details, see the document „Informace o průběhu předsednictví České republiky ve Visegrádské 
skupině v letech 2015–2016, PRO INFORMACI ČLENŮ VLÁDY, MZV ČR, čj.:107504/2016-OSE 
[Information regarding the Activities during the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group in 2015–2016, 
FOR INFORMATION TO THE MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT]”, no. 107504/2016-OSE]. 
58 See “Joint Communiqué of the Visegrad Group Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 11 September 
2015”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, available at: http://www.mzv.cz/file/1605886/
Joint_Statement_MFA_11092015_final.pdf [accessed: 17.01.2017]. 
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ation in the Central European region and (in this case not so much related to 
migration) the possible joint assistance and support to the Baltic countries wi-
thin the framework of the NATO reassurance measures. The participants have 
agreed, while discussing the migration crisis and the fight against terrorism, 
that the basic precondition for mitigating the migration crisis in Europe is in-
stituting and enforcing an effective protection of the external borders of the 
Schengen Area and strict adherence to the existing regulations. The represen-
tative of Hungary has greatly appreciated the aid extended by the other V4 co-
untries towards protecting the Hungarian borders. The V4 representatives have 
also agreed that the stability of the Western Balkans is crucial for the security 
of Central Europe and they have declared that if the migration flow intensifies 
further in the upcoming spring months, the V4 countries must enhance and 
strengthen their cooperation with FYROM and other Western Balkans countries 
and, if needed, offer their security capacities, including the military assets (per-
sonnel, financial resources, materiel and technical support). It was also agreed 
that the V4 countries would share information about their bilateral negotiations 
with France and the United States related to strengthening the military contribu-
tion to the fight against terrorism in North Africa, Sahel and the Middle East. 
The second extraordinary summit of the V4 dealing with migration and 
also with the UK reform agenda, organized at the same time to commemorate 
the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Visegrad Group, took place in 
Prague on 15 February 2016. The FYROM President Georgi Ivanov and the 
Bulgarian Prime Minister Bojko Borisov were also invited to attend. The main 
topic of the summit was once more finding the solution to the migration cri-
sis, cooperation between the V4 and the countries of the Western Balkans, pro-
vision of aid to the countries worst hit by the migration contingency(and the 
above mentioned 25th anniversary of the Visegrad Group). Two declarations 
were adopted at the summit: the Prague Declaration commemorating the 25th 
anniversary of the V4;59 and the Joint Statement on Migration, which, among 
other things, has confirmed the effort on part of the V4 to reach a common 
European solution for the migration crisis, especially the need to significantly 
curb the migration flow, swiftly improve the protection of the EU external bor-
ders and implement the Joint EU-Turkey Action Plan (from now on the EU- 
Turkey Plan). Furthermore, the declaration also contained the pledge to con-
tinue assisting the countries of the Western Balkans, which have been worst 
hit by the migration crisis. In this regard, the role of Greece was singled out, as 
59 “An Extraordinary Summit of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group Countries, Prague, 
15 February 2016: Prague Declaration (Joint Statement on the 25th V4 Anniversary)”, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Czech Republic, available at: https://www.vlada.cz/assets/media-centrum/aktualne/160215_
V4_25-let_EN_final.pdf [accessed: 17.01.2016]. 
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well as the determination of the V4 to help the Greeks to carry out a more ef-
ficient registration of the refugees and to more efficiently cope with the various 
migration pressures. The declaration also mentioned the possibility of imple-
menting a backup/alternative plan (“Plan B”). This plan would be designed to 
prevent mutually uncoordinated closures of the internal borders within the EU 
and of the borders in the Balkans in case the provisions of the agreement between 
the EU and Turkey would not be implemented in a satisfactory fashion. During 
the meetings, the V4 again emphasised its negative stance toward a permanent 
relocation mechanism; at the same time, the V4 declared its full support to the 
measures taken on the EU level with the purpose to more efficiently protect the ex-
ternal borders, including a more intensive cooperation with the third countries.60
As the Czech Presidency in the Visegrad Group was coming to an end, 
a summit of the prime ministers of the V4 countries was held in Prague 
on 8 June 2016. On this occasion, the prime ministers have issued a joint dec-
laration. In this declaration, they pointed out the need of a deeper mutual un-
derstanding in Europe, of an active and constructive dialogue, and of finding 
a compromise solution to the problems that divide the European countries 
and societies. The joint declaration dealt primarily with the issue of migration, 
defence, BREXIT referendum, continued assistance to Ukraine, the medium 
term financial framework and the solution of the situation on the markets with 
agricultural commodities. When it came to migration, the V4 countries stres-
sed that it was necessary to strive for joint and coherent solution on the Euro-
pean level and to focus on the root causes of the migration crisis. An important 
issue to be taken into account was the protection of the external EU borders, fully 
functioning hotspots (for more on hotspots, see the further chapters), an efficient re-
turns policy and, last but not least, an effective reform of the Dublin Regulation.61
The cooperation of the V4 countries has also been smooth and efficient 
with regards to the coordination of the joint positions before the meetings 
of the Council or the Council of Europe (from now CE). The issue of migra-
tion was discussed at the extraordinary meeting of the Council, which took 
place already on 23 April 2015. The aim of this meeting was to find an effi-
cient common response of the EU and its member states to the ongoing migra-
tion crisis on the EU’s southern borders on the backdrop of the tragic events 
in the Mediterranean. The outcome of the meeting was the adoption of the 
60 “Joint Statement of V4 Prime Ministers on Migration, Prague, 15 February 2016”, The Visegrad Group, 
available at: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-on [accessed: 17.01.2017]. 
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joint statement about specific measures to be taken in four areas – saving hu-
man lives, combating the criminal aspects of migration, prevention of illegal 
migration and the strengthening of solidarity and responsibility within the EU. 
The Council made a decision on these issues and called on the High Represent-
ative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Frederica 
Mogherini to prepare a plan for an EU military mission with the objective to 
identify, seize and destroy vessels used for human trafficking in the Mediterra-
nean Sea. A decision was also made to strengthen the general presence on the 
seas, mainly to prevent the regular drowning of the migrants in the Mediterra-
nean Sea, and also to allocate more financial resources to the rescue operations 
carried out by FRONTEX (operations Triton and Poseidon).62 The member 
states have declared their resolve to undertake more drastic steps against the 
human trafficking networks and to punish the related illegal activities, as well 
as the resolve to cooperate in a more intensive fashion with the EUROPOL, 
FRONTEX, EASO and EUROJUST agencies. The Czech Republic in partic-
ular has offered to provide CZK 10 million for the FRONTEX rescue opera-
tions, 60 experts to cooperate in the joint endeavours as well as technical equip-
ment (CASA aircraft with military crew for search and rescue operations on the 
seas, ATVs, night vision equipment, etc.).63
On 25–26 June 2015, a regular meeting of the Council took place, with the 
main emphasis on a thorough discussion of both the proposal of the European 
Commission (from now on EC) to establish a relocation and resettlement me-
chanism for the refugees and on the issue of the returns policy and cooperation 
with the third countries. Before the Council meeting started, the prime mini-
sters of the V4 countries met with the EC President Donald Tusk. After this 
meeting, the V4 prime ministers met for the traditional coordination to prepa-
re a joint position for the upcoming talks. 
During the long discussions on the final conclusions of the meeting, the V4 
countries were able to include the reference to the voluntary nature as the ba-
sic principle of the proposed relocation and resettlement mechanism. The tem-
porary and extraordinary nature of the relocation scheme was also emphasised 
and it was established that a consensus is needed when a decision would be 
made concerning the redistribution and resettlement among the member sta-
tes. The Council agreed with the proposed relocation of the 40,000 refugees 
from Italy and Greece and with the resettlement of 20,000 persons from third 
62 “Special Meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – Statement”, European Council, 
available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23-special-euco-statement/ 
[accessed: 17.01.2017]. 
63 See “Zpráva z jednání Evropské rady 23. dubna 2015 [Summary of the European Council Meeting 
on 23 April 2015]”, Úřad vlády ČR [Office of the Government of the Czech Republic]. 
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countries, but only if the principle of voluntariness and consensus was main-
tained. Thus, the initial proposal of the Council to set mandatory quotas for 
the redistribution of migrants was rejected and the right of each individual EU 
member state to decide on the nature and scope of its involvement in the so-
lidarity-based activities in the area of migration was upheld. The preparation 
of the conference on migration in La Valletta was also supported by the Coun-
cil. The Council agreed on the establishment of reception facilities in the mem-
ber states worst hit by the migration crisis, the so-called hotspots.64 During the 
talks, the Czech Republic was arguing for geographically balanced measures in 
the migration area, more effective returns policy, balance between the principle 
of solidarity and responsibility of the member states; at the same time, it oppo-
sed the implementation of a mandatory mechanism of migrant distribution.65
The next extraordinary and informal meeting of the European Council 
dedicated to the migration and refugee crisis took place on 23 September 2015 
in Brussels. Before the meeting, the V4 countries issued a joint statement on the 
current migration situation, using some of the long-term V4 policy objectives 
and priorities. Among other things, this document states: “„…that an effective 
management of the root causes of migration flows must be the steppingstone 
of EU approach to the current situation”, and further that „the key elements 
of the EU common approach for the coming months should include especially: 
ensure effective control and protection of the EU external borders in all aspects; 
swift adoption of a common EU list of safe countries of origin; more effective 
return policy accompanied by operational readmission agreements with key 
countries; swift implementation of functional hotspots; strengthening the fight 
against organized crime and trafficking; more active engagement in solving the 
situation in Libya, Syria and the Middle East; more effective and targeted as-
sistance (including through conditionality) to countries of origin and of transit 
with the aim of combating root causes of migration.” The declaration included 
an appeal to the EC to present a detailed and realistic plan of implementation 
of similar measures as those described. The V4 countries have also confirmed 
their readiness to participate in the common effort to manage the migration 
crisis and to contribute their share in implementing the specific plan.66
64 “European Council Conclusions, 25–26 June 2015”, European Council, available at: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2015/6/40802199900_en.pdf [accessed: 17.01.2017]. 
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On the top of the agenda of the Council meeting was the protection 
of external borders (the discussion focused primarily on the creation of Union 
Coast and Border Guard), relations with Turkey and the need to further de-
epen the mutual cooperation, increasing the financial support provided to the 
UNHCR, WFP and the third countries in the impacted region in order to 
improve the conditions of the refugees stationed outside of the EU area, and 
intensification of the aid provided to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey and the 
countries of the Western Balkans to deal with refugee influx. The prime mini-
sters have issued a declaration67 which includes the basic constituent elements 
of the V4 position regarding the long-term solutions to the issue of migration. 
The need to uphold the existing rules and regulations, including the Dublin 
Regulation and the Schengen acquis, was emphasised in the document. In ad-
dition, the priority areas of activities needed to react to the migration crisis 
were outlined here. The declaration also contained a specific time table for the 
launching of the hotspots, which were supposed to be in operation by the end 
of November 2015 at latest. 
As seen from Prague, the discussion at the summit was dealing with priori-
ties that the Czech Republic has been in any case supporting in the long run. 
In accordance with the priorities established in the mandate approved for this 
meeting, the Czech Prime Minister Sobotka stressed the need to find the so-
lutions of the root causes of illegal migration and the protection of the EU 
external borders. He also expressed his full support for the adoption of a jo-
int declaration, which outlines specific measures to be taken in this direction. 
The Czech Republic has also pledged to further enhance its participation in the 
measures undertaken to tackle the migration crisis and it has supported the ef-
forts to improve the living conditions of the refugees in Syria and the neighbo-
uring countries and announced its intention to increase its financial contribu-
tion to the budget of the World Food Programme.68
The Council has welcomed the EU-Turkey Plan, the implementation 
of which should have led, among other things, to the facilitation of the visa lib-
eralization between the EU and Turkey and to the fulfilment of the readmission 
treaty. In the conclusions, the Council has appealed for a proper implementa-
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role of the FRONTEX agency in returns policy. The HR Federica Mogherini 
67 “Informal Meeting of EU Heads of State or Government on Migration, 23 September 2015 
– Statement”, European Council, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cs/press/press-releases/ 
2015/09/23-statement-informal-meeting/ [accessed: 17.01.2017].
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[Summary of the Informal Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States on 
23 September 2015]”, Úřad vlády ČR [Office of the Government of the Czech Republic]. 
64
countries, but only if the principle of voluntariness and consensus was main-
tained. Thus, the initial proposal of the Council to set mandatory quotas for 
the redistribution of migrants was rejected and the right of each individual EU 
member state to decide on the nature and scope of its involvement in the so-
lidarity-based activities in the area of migration was upheld. The preparation 
of the conference on migration in La Valletta was also supported by the Coun-
cil. The Council agreed on the establishment of reception facilities in the mem-
ber states worst hit by the migration crisis, the so-called hotspots.64 During the 
talks, the Czech Republic was arguing for geographically balanced measures in 
the migration area, more effective returns policy, balance between the principle 
of solidarity and responsibility of the member states; at the same time, it oppo-
sed the implementation of a mandatory mechanism of migrant distribution.65
The next extraordinary and informal meeting of the European Council 
dedicated to the migration and refugee crisis took place on 23 September 2015 
in Brussels. Before the meeting, the V4 countries issued a joint statement on the 
current migration situation, using some of the long-term V4 policy objectives 
and priorities. Among other things, this document states: “„…that an effective 
management of the root causes of migration flows must be the steppingstone 
of EU approach to the current situation”, and further that „the key elements 
of the EU common approach for the coming months should include especially: 
ensure effective control and protection of the EU external borders in all aspects; 
swift adoption of a common EU list of safe countries of origin; more effective 
return policy accompanied by operational readmission agreements with key 
countries; swift implementation of functional hotspots; strengthening the fight 
against organized crime and trafficking; more active engagement in solving the 
situation in Libya, Syria and the Middle East; more effective and targeted as-
sistance (including through conditionality) to countries of origin and of transit 
with the aim of combating root causes of migration.” The declaration included 
an appeal to the EC to present a detailed and realistic plan of implementation 
of similar measures as those described. The V4 countries have also confirmed 
their readiness to participate in the common effort to manage the migration 
crisis and to contribute their share in implementing the specific plan.66
64 “European Council Conclusions, 25–26 June 2015”, European Council, available at: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2015/6/40802199900_en.pdf [accessed: 17.01.2017]. 
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On the top of the agenda of the Council meeting was the protection 
of external borders (the discussion focused primarily on the creation of Union 
Coast and Border Guard), relations with Turkey and the need to further de-
epen the mutual cooperation, increasing the financial support provided to the 
UNHCR, WFP and the third countries in the impacted region in order to 
improve the conditions of the refugees stationed outside of the EU area, and 
intensification of the aid provided to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey and the 
countries of the Western Balkans to deal with refugee influx. The prime mini-
sters have issued a declaration67 which includes the basic constituent elements 
of the V4 position regarding the long-term solutions to the issue of migration. 
The need to uphold the existing rules and regulations, including the Dublin 
Regulation and the Schengen acquis, was emphasised in the document. In ad-
dition, the priority areas of activities needed to react to the migration crisis 
were outlined here. The declaration also contained a specific time table for the 
launching of the hotspots, which were supposed to be in operation by the end 
of November 2015 at latest. 
As seen from Prague, the discussion at the summit was dealing with priori-
ties that the Czech Republic has been in any case supporting in the long run. 
In accordance with the priorities established in the mandate approved for this 
meeting, the Czech Prime Minister Sobotka stressed the need to find the so-
lutions of the root causes of illegal migration and the protection of the EU 
external borders. He also expressed his full support for the adoption of a jo-
int declaration, which outlines specific measures to be taken in this direction. 
The Czech Republic has also pledged to further enhance its participation in the 
measures undertaken to tackle the migration crisis and it has supported the ef-
forts to improve the living conditions of the refugees in Syria and the neighbo-
uring countries and announced its intention to increase its financial contribu-
tion to the budget of the World Food Programme.68
The Council has welcomed the EU-Turkey Plan, the implementation 
of which should have led, among other things, to the facilitation of the visa lib-
eralization between the EU and Turkey and to the fulfilment of the readmission 
treaty. In the conclusions, the Council has appealed for a proper implementa-
tion of the returns directives by the member states and for strengthening of the 
role of the FRONTEX agency in returns policy. The HR Federica Mogherini 
67 “Informal Meeting of EU Heads of State or Government on Migration, 23 September 2015 
– Statement”, European Council, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cs/press/press-releases/ 
2015/09/23-statement-informal-meeting/ [accessed: 17.01.2017].
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was tasked with preparing incentives for the third countries to become more 
active in cooperating in the area of returns (i.e., negotiating and implementing 
the readmission agreements).69
The Czech Republic has been able, with the support of other V4 coun-
tries, to influence the conclusions by including the principles of better inter-
connectedness between the establishment and the functioning of hotspots with 
the already approved relocation measures so that the conclusions would not 
presuppose or exclude any potential future options in the area of relocation 
(for example the permanent relocation mechanism).70
On 12 November 2015, an extraordinary meeting of the heads of state 
and governments of the EU member states took place in La Valletta, Malta. 
The meeting was called to tackle the issue of migration and refugee crisis. 
It was an informal meeting, which meant that there was no formal written 
directive adopted as its immediate outcome. The Czech delegation was led by the 
Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka who, at the behest of the Polish government, 
represented also Poland. 
Before the meeting, the by now traditional coordination of the V4 took 
place. The prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have 
adopted a declaration which outlined priorities for solving the root causes 
of the migration crisis. In this declaration, they have also pledged to increase the 
joint contribution of the V4 to the EU trust fund for Africa by 400,000 EUR. 
They have also declared that each of the countries will provide 75 additional 
experts to the FONTEX and EASO agencies to strengthen the protection 
of the external borders.71
The sole topic of the summit in La Valletta was migration. The primary 
issue under question was the strengthening of cooperation with third coun-
tries in order to curb the migration flow, the establishment of hotspots in It-
aly and Greece, the furnishing of adequate capacities to the FRONTEX and 
EASO agencies and the strengthening of the protection of the external borders. 
The discussion was primarily centred on the cooperation with Turkey in the 
area of dealing with the migration crisis. The president and the vice-president 
of the EC have informed the members of the Council about the developments 
in the negotiations regarding the implementation of the Action Plan between 
the EU and Turkey. The representatives of the member states and governments 
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of the EU countries have agreed on the need to organize a summit as soon 
as possible. The pledge to provide Turkey financial assistance up to EUR 3 billion 
to improve the living conditions of the refugees staying on the Turkish soil was 
also declared.72
On 17 and 18 December 2015, a regular session of the Council took place 
in Brussels. This was the last meeting to take place in 2015. The meeting was 
dealing primarily with the issues of migration, the United Kingdom, fight 
against terrorism, the economic and monetary union, the internal market, en-
ergy union and climate change policy and external relations. Before the be-
ginning of the Council, the usual coordination meeting of the V4 took place, 
which led to the adoption of the joint statement of the prime ministers of the 
V4 countries on migration, the United Kingdom and energy policy.73
The Council has declared that for the sake of maintaining the integrity 
of the Schengen Area, it is necessary to restore control over its external borders. 
In this regard, the Council has asked for a swift solution of the deficiencies re-
lated to the functioning of the existing hotspots, i.e. to ensure the registration 
of all migrants entering the EU is taking place. This would include providing 
sufficient capacities and resources for the proper functioning of hotspots, pro-
viding a clear and precise time table for launching additional hotspots and en-
suring that the FRONTEX and EASO agencies have all the tools they need. 
It was also emphasised that it is necessary to carry out the controls on the 
external borders in a systematic fashion. In the area of cooperation with the 
third countries, the Council has stressed the importance of the implementation 
of the outputs from the conference on the migration routes through the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Western Balkans (25 October 2015), the La Valletta 
Migration summit (11–12 November 2015) and the EU-Turkey Summit 
(29 November 2015). 
From the viewpoint of the Czech Republic, this could be seen as a success-
ful Council meeting. The Czech delegation supported the approval of the final 
version of the conclusions, which were worded in line with the mandate given 
to the Czech prime minister. The Czech Republic welcomed the fact that the 
European Council has focused on the protection of the external borders, which 
has been a long-term priority of the Czech Republic. In accordance with its 
declared stance, the Czech Republic has urged the European Council to faci-
litate a swifter launching of the hotspots in order to register all the migrants at 
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their entry points into the EU. The majority of the member states including 
the Czech Republic have also expressed their support to the Council initiative 
to establish the European Coastal and Boarder Guard. The Czech Republic, to-
gether with the other V4 countries, has been able to stress in the final version 
of the Council conclusions74 the continued need to preserve the Schengen 
Area, to strengthen the protection of the external border and to extend aid to 
the non-member states situated along the Western Balkans migration route.75
In 2016, the first regular meeting of the Council took place on 18–19 Fe-
bruary in Brussels and dealt with topics such as the United Kingdom, migra-
tion, external relation and the European Semester. The V4 countries met before 
the Council session; the discussion about providing personnel and technical aid 
to FYROM in order to bolster the protection of its borders was also attended 
by the prime minister of Croatia and Slovenia. At the beginning of the Coun-
cil session, the heads of state and the presidents of the Union institutions have 
adopted a joint statement condemning the terrorist attacks in Ankara (16 Fe-
bruary 2016) and expressing the solidarity of Europe with Turkey. The Coun-
cil has declared that the main goal in the area of migration is the abrupt cur-
bing of the migration flow, protection of the external borders, putting limits 
to illegal migration in general and the preservation of integrity of the Schen-
gen Area. The Council has also welcomed the decision of NATO to launch an 
operation in the Aegean Sea and it has declared its intention to closely coope-
rate with the Alliance, especially through the FRONTEX Agency. The priori-
ty, according to the Council, was the implementation of the EU-Turkey Plan. 
The Council has also appreciated that an agreement was reached on the finan-
cial facility designed to help the refugees in Turkey and on the preparation of the 
voluntary mechanism for the resettlement of migrants/refugees from Greece. 
Regarding the Western Balkans migration route, it was declared by the Council 
that it is necessary to prevent the uncontrolled passage of migrants and to avoid 
uncoordinated measures taken by the individual states. The Council has called 
for a total adherence to the Schengen Border Codex and for a full functioning 
of the hotspots, so that all the incoming migrants could be properly identified 
and registered. It also asked for speeding up the preparation of the proposal to 
establish the European Coast and Border Guard. 
The Czech Republic supported the presented wording of the conclusions on 
migration, since it was in line with the long-term priorities of both the Czech 
Republic and the V4. It has also welcomed the emphasis that was placed on cur-
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bing the migration flows, protection of the external borders, attaining the full 
functioning of the hotspots and the implementation of the EU-Turkey Plan.76
On 7 March 2016, as a follow-up to the Council session in February, 
an extraordinary meeting of the heads of state of the EU member states was or-
ganized in Brussels. The meeting was also attended by the Turkish Prime Mini-
ster Davutoğlu. This extraordinary summit focused primarily on the cooperation 
between EU and Turkey during the migration crisis and on the current situation 
with regards to the Western Balkans migration route. The new proposals of An-
kara regarding the joint efforts to deal with the migration crisis were presented 
at the summit, which were accepted as the basic premises for further endeavours 
on this topic in the future. The main outcome of this meeting was the statement 
issued by the heads of state and the prime ministers of the EU countries.77
The Czech Republic has considered the cooperation with Turkey to be one 
of the key elements and tools to resolve the migration crisis, and thus it had 
appreciated the outcomes of the summit. It had also declared that it is ready to 
work towards their implementation. The crucial part of the cooperation with 
Turkey, as seen from Prague, is the returns policy. The Czech Republic sup-
ports the visa liberalization given that all the conditions included in the curren-
tly effective liberalization plan are met. Together with the other V4 countries, 
the Czech Republic has been able to promote the inclusion of a guarantee that the 
cooperation with Turkey would not lead to an increase in the already approved 
quotas for the individual member states for relocation and resettlement. It was also 
successful in including the pledge to assist the countries located along the Western 
Balkans migration route, which is in line with the long-term Czech position.78
The issue of cooperation with Turkey has also been the focus of the regu-
lar Council session on 17–18 March 2016. The conclusions regarding migra-
tion were ultimately approved and, with the Turkish Prime Minister Davutoğlu 
being present, also the joint statement of the EU and Turkey. In this statement, 
the EU and Turkey have agreed on various aspects of their cooperation with the 
aim to curb the irregular migration flow from Turkey to the European main-
land. Turkey has pledged that by 20 March 2016, it will start accepting all the 
migrants that will be returned from the Greek islands.79
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In the approved conclusions, the Council has confirmed its standing strate-
gy to deal with migration crisis, with the priority being the recovery of control 
over the external borders. The Council has called for providing more assistan-
ce to Greece in the area of humanitarian aid, the full functioning of hotspots 
and implementing the returns to Turkey. The Council conclusions also decla-
red that the jointly accepted Declaration of the EU and Turkey does not pre-
suppose any new obligations for the member states in the area of relocations 
and resettlement. At the same time, the EU has declared that it expects Turkey 
to meet the highest standards in the area of democracy, the rule of law and the 
adherence to the basic civic rights and freedoms such as the free expression. 
The European has also called for enhancing the existing cooperation with the 
countries of the Western Balkans and it tasked the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) to prepare an incentive package in support of the sustainable growth 
in the countries of the region of Western Balkans and in the southern EU ne-
ighbourhood in general. In addition to this, the Council has also asked for the 
continued support of Jordan and Lebanon to improve the situation of refugees 
in both countries. Furthermore, it has declared its readiness to support the na-
tional unity government in Libya.80
In general, the Czech Republic has welcomed the agreements with Turkey 
concerning the cooperation in the area of migration and it has supported the 
ratification of this treaty in line with the mandate given to the prime minister 
based on the official Czech policy. At the same time, the Czech Republic has 
achieved, together with the other V4 countries, to influence in a significant way 
the final wording of the EU-Turkey Joint Declaration and of the conclusions 
of the Council. The Czech Republic has been able to include an article into 
the text of the agreement, which stipulates that the agreed framework will be 
terminated in case that the available resources for relocation and resettlement 
would be all spent. The Czech Republic was also able to include a guarantee 
into the Council conclusions that the agreement with Turkey would not lead 
to any new pledges on part of the member states for relocation and resettle-
ment. The Czech Republic has welcomed, however, that the agreement enables 
the speeding of the process visa liberalization only if and when the condition 
that Turkey fulfils all the points of the visa liberalization plan is met. The Czech 
Republic has thus scored a victory in including the emphasis on the protection 
of the basic rights and freedoms into the EC conclusions; at the same time, 
it managed to push through an addendum to the conclusions with regards to 
the cooperation with the countries of the Western Balkans.81
80 “European Council Conclusions, 17–18 March 2016”, European Council, available at: http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-european-council-conclusions/ [accessed: 
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The last regular session of the Council during the Czech Presidency of 
the V4 took place on 28 and 29 June 2016 in Brussels. This session focused 
on the issue of migration, economic problems, external relations and, above all, 
the results of the referendum about the future membership of the UK in the EU. 
The accepted conclusions stated that, as a follow-up to the agreement be-
tween the EU and Turkey and to the agreement to fully implement the Schen-
gen Border Codex, the migration flow coming through the Western Balkans 
route has been stopped. The Council stated that more efforts are needed to de-
velop a sustainable solution to the current situation and it also called for the 
continued implementation of the agreement, permanent assistance to the co-
untries of the Western Balkans and watchfulness regarding the possible emer-
gence of new migration routes. The Council members have agreed on the need 
to develop an effective partnership framework of cooperation with the indivi-
dual countries of origin and transit, which should be based on efficient incen-
tives and adequate conditionality.82
The Czech Republic supported the conclusions of the EC. Regarding the 
migration issue, it has welcomed the focus on the external aspects of migration, 
as these have been in line with the long-term position of the Czech Republic to 
resolve the root causes of the migration crisis. The Czech Republic has support-
ed the implementation of the agreement with Turkey, which has, in combina-
tion with the closure of the Western Balkans migration route, led to the migra-
tion situation in Europe becoming much more pacified. At the same time, the 
Czech Republic supported the enhancement of the dialogue with the countries 
of origin and transit countries and it has appreciated that the Council has con-
firmed that this cooperation would be based on conditionality.83
The strongest emphasis of the Czech V4 Presidency was placed on the in-
ternal cohesion of the Visegrad Group. Despite the fact that in this particular 
time period a number of dynamic developments in the area of international 
relations have taken place, the V4 countries have mostly been able to agree on 
all the key issues. The cooperation between the V4 countries can thus be seen 
as constructive and consensual. The strongly articulated position of the V4 has 
contributed to the “V4 brand” being perceived as relevant on the European 
level. In certain areas, unfortunately, this increased relevance and perception 
had also negative impacts for the image of the V4 as its position has often been 
criticized for being too defensive and for not exhibiting enough solidarity with 
the other countries. 
82 European Council Conclusion, 28 June 2016”, European Council, available at: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/28-euco-conclusions/ [accessed: 17.01.2017].
83 See “Zpráva z jednání Evropské rady 28. a 29. června 2016 [Summary of the European Council 
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The documents related to the migration agenda, which have been adopt-
ed by the V4 countries during the Czech Presidency, have a reflected quite 
a broad consensus on these issues. The emphasis was placed primarily on the 
preservation of the voluntary nature of the EU solidarity measures. In line with 
this principle, the proposed mandatory redistribution mechanism was rejected. 
Emphasis was also placed on the protection of the external borders of the EU.
1.5.2. The Alternative V4 Plan (“Plan B”)
On 15 February 2016, an extraordinary summit of the V4 countries took 
place in Prague, with the president of FYROM and prime minister of Bulgaria 
also attending. The main issue discussed was the cooperation of the participa-
ting countries in the context of the migration crisis. At the same time, the sum-
mit served as a coordination meeting for the preparation of the joint position 
V4 position before the upcoming Council session which was intended to focus 
on the protection of the external border of the Schengen Area.
The V4 countries have presented an alternative plan for providing security 
of the external Schengen borders in case the cooperation with Greece and Tur-
key (very much promoted by Germany) have failed. All the V4 countries em-
phasized that they would prefer a common European solution.84 In case when 
it would not be possible to enhance the external Schengen border, the idea 
was to establish a “reserve border management system” in Europe. This system 
would operate on the general line Bulgaria – FYROM. This plan was present-
ed to the media by the Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka during a press 
conference in the Czech Parliament. He stated that the crucial turning point 
is the agreement in Syria and he also emphasised the need for the common 
European Coast and Border Guard and the fulfilment of the agreements 
on part of Turkey. The Prime Minister declared: “Without resolving the war 
in Syria at least half of the push factors behind the present strong wave of mi-
gration will not be resolved.” He added: “We need to strengthen the protec-
tion of the external Schengen borders and establish common European coast 
and border guard… And if none of this works out, we need to create a back-up 
system on the line Bulgaria-FYROM, prepare certain technical measures there 
so that we would be able to regulate the migration, if it will not be regulated 
84 For more information, see “Visegrád položil na stůl plán B pro migrační krizi. Nevěří, že je 
Řecko schopné uhlídat vlastní hranice [Visegrad Presented Plan B for the Migration Crisis: It Does Not 




in Turkey or in Greece.”85 The representatives of the other Czech political par-
ties have largely welcomed the prime minister’s proposal. For example, Ondřej 
Benešík, the head of the Parliament European Committee and an MP for the 
People’s Party, stated for the Czech Press Agency (ČTK): “It seems like a logi-
cal solution.” According to Benešík, the gist of the problem is in other words to 
remove Greece from Schengen. The first deputy chairman of the TOP 09 Party 
Marek Ženíšek said that bolstering the northern borders of Greece would to 
a more effective control, while the deputy chairman of the Communist Par-
ty Jiří Dolejš added that from purely technical point of view such a solu-
tion is feasible, but the diplomatic aspects of it would be more complicated. 
The chairman of the opposition ODS Party Petr Fiala expressed his opinion 
that the prime minister should stop “coming up with impromptu solutions” 
and present a specific plan. He said: “So far, we have witnessed how the mem-
bers of the government compete with each other in coming up with various 
ideas, but these are often contradictory.”86
The Czech Prime Minister Sobotka further stated that in the upcoming ne-
gotiations and talks in Brussels, the Czech Republic will still push for taking 
specific and practical steps to help manage the migration crisis and that Prague 
is ready to help others. In an interview given to the Czech Radio, he mentioned: 
“This is nothing against Greece. We will not propose expelling Greece from 
Schengen.” Greece, however, must start to carry out its duties with regards to 
guarding the external Schengen borders.87 So far as aid to Greece and Italy was 
concerned, Sobotka saw the main problem with the fact that these countries are 
often not able to specify what the Czech Republic could actually do for them. 
Especially the Athens are often criticized by the Czech, but also other Europe-
an politicians, because of their inability to manage the influx of refugees. If the 
“back-up border system” was set up, the EU would not have to rely on Greece 
in case that Germany and/or Austria would close their borders.88
If Germany and/or Austria were to close its borders, the Czech prime min-
ister would see it as a sign that the Western Balkans was thrown overboard. 
This could, according to his opinion, easily bring back to life old grievances 
85 For more information, see “Sobotkův plán B: Záložní hraniční systém v Evropě [Sobotka’s Plan: 
The Back-up Border System in Europe]”, Euroskop.cz, https://www.euroskop.cz/9002/26838/clanek/
sobotkuv-plan-b-zalozni-hranicni-system-v-evrope/ [accessed: 17.01.2017].
86 For more information, see ibidem.
87 For more information, see “Musí být záložní řešení, kdyby Německo zavřelo hranice, hájí Sobotka 
plán B [There Must Be a Back-up Solution If Germany Closes the Borders; Sobotka Defends Plan B]”, 
iDNES.cz, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/summit-v4-praha-2016-0z4-/domaci.aspx?c=A160215_064504_doma 
ci_hro [accessed: 17.01.2017]. 
88 For more information, see “Sobotkův plán B…”
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and enmities, which have led to the wars and conflicts in the Balkans in the 
past. Sobotka also stated that it has been proven that the quotas are no lon-
ger working. With regards to this, he also said: “It is reasonable to reach a deal 
with Turkey, but it cannot be the only solution, we must have a back-up plan.” 
He has discussed this proposed back-up plan in a phone call with the Aus-
trian Chancellor Werner Faymann. As the spokesperson of the Czech Office 
of the Government Martin Ayer later summed up: “Both heads of government 
have agreed on the pressing need to regulate the migration flow, to include the 
Western Balkans into the process of finding the solution to the migration crisis 
and on the need of the joint European coordinated response.” The State Sec-
retary for European Affairs Tomas Prouza added: “We all want the agreement 
between the EU and Turkey to be functional. It is well manageable to stop 
the flow of refugees in Turkey; it gets much more difficult anywhere further on 
the European soil.”89
The V4 countries have communicated in an intensive manner with Croatia, 
Greece, Serbia and Slovenia prior to the summit on migration. Prime Minister 
Sobotka repeatedly argued that: “Visegrad region priority remains the imple-
mentation of the EU-Turkey Action Plan, which so far has not brought satis-
factory results.” The goal of the V4 summit, according to Sobotka, was to as-
sure the Western Balkans states of the Central European solidarity with them: 
“The countries must not remain alone in this time of crisis and the entire Europe-
an Union must help them.” The main topic of the summit was focused on finding 
a way to help the Western Balkans countries with protection of their borders.
The forthcoming V4 summit was not seen as good news in Germany. 
According to the German magazine Der Spiegel, the V4 countries and their 
intention to protect the Schengen borders and to close the Balkans refugee 
route have stood up against the plan of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
which was counting on including Turkey in the solution to the migration crisis. 
The Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has stated that Germany has com-
plained about the V4 summit to the Slovak ministry of foreign affairs. The 
Czech State Secretary for European Affairs Tomáš Prouza was approached by 
the German Ambassador to the Czech Republic who was inquiring about 
the main goals and the agenda of the meeting.90
The FYROM President Giorgi Ivanov has just prior to the summit met with 
the Czech President Miloš Zeman, who is outspoken on the issue of insufficient 
integration of the Muslim refugees into the society and who warns that these 
refugees represent a security risk to Europe. While meeting with Ivanov, Zeman 
89 For more information, see “Musí být záložní řešení…”
90 Ibidem. 
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stated: “I am glad that the Czech Republic is taking part in providing assistance 
to your country.” The FYROM president reacted by saying: “Friendship is best 
known by how we help each other in times of hardship and distress”. At the 
beginning of February 2016, the Czech Republic has sent 27 police officers to 
FYROM to help guard the borders. President Ivanov has mentioned during the 
meeting with the Czech Prime Minister Sobotka that the assistance provided 
to FYROM by the EC is virtually non-existent. The Bulgarian Prime Minister 
Bojko Borisov has met the German Chancellor Merkel before the V4 summit 
and assured her that Bulgaria and FYROM do not wish the Balkans to beco-
me a buffer zone dividing the EU and the migrant wave. The office of the Bul-
garian prime minister stated in this regard: “The Prime Minister has informed 
the Chancellor about the position that Bulgaria will present at the upcoming 
meeting in Prague and has underlined the solidarity of Bulgaria with Greece 
and the Bulgarian disagreement with the building of fence between FYROM 
and Greece.” The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikos Kotzias was also 
supposed to attend the V4 summit, but he has apologized and cancelled his 
participation at the last minute.91 On the same day as the summit, a meeting 
of the V4 ministers of interior also took place. At the meeting, the mini-
sters have agreed to jointly send their experts to FYROM within two weeks. 
This mission had the main objective of ascertaining the real needs and the requ-
ired scope of cooperation in the area of border protection and migration con-
trol on the Western Balkans migration route. It was agreed that Serbia and Slo-
venia will be also be invited to take part in the mission.92
1.5.3. The Regional Outreach – CEDC, the Salzburg Forum 
and Their Significance 
Throughout 2016, during the presidency of Austria, the cooperation 
between Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC – Austria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland as an observer, Slovakia, Slovenia) coun-
tries was intensified in a significant way, especially in the area of managing the 
migration crisis and assisting the countries situated on the Western Balkans 
migration route. On 7–8 November 2015, an important meeting of the de-
fence ministers of the CEDC countries took place in Vienna. Also invited were 
the representatives of Montenegro, FYROM and Serbia; the second day of this 
event was spent visiting Sarajevo which was supposed to symbolize the support 
of CEDC to Bosnia-Herzegovina in its efforts to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic 
91 Ibidem.
92 For more information, see “Sobotkův plán B…”
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91 Ibidem.
92 For more information, see “Sobotkův plán B…”
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structures. In 2017, the presidency of the CEDC is taken by the Czech Re-
public and it is expected that it will continue in the same direction that 
Austria has initiated. 
Another regional platform, where migration was discussed, was the Salzburg 
Forum. The member states at the moment are Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Salz-
burg Declaration has identified the key areas of cooperation for the ministers 
of interior of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, namely police cooper-
ation, border controls, illegal migration, harmonization of asylum standards and 
procedures and regular exchange of information and positions on these issues. 
In the second half of 2016, the Czech Republic was presiding over the forum. 
It thus had the opportunity to shape the content of the individual meetings to 
a large degree. On 3–4 November 2016 a ministerial conference took place 
in Prague with the participation of the representatives from the Western Balkans 
countries. The participating countries then adopted a joint declaration.93
The agenda of the conference focused on security issues (primarily on the 
cross-border security cooperation, the migration issue and information shar-
ing in the fight against terrorism. The significance of the closing of the Western 
Balkans migration route was emphasised; the protection of the external bor-
ders, implementation of the EU-Turkey Plan and providing aid to the coun-
tries of the Western Balkans have remained among the priorities. A discus-
sion also transpired on the concept of flexible solidarity where differences still 
exist between the Salzburg Forum states, the European Commission and Malta. 
The ministers have expressed their support for improvements in informa-
tion exchange, information sharing and interoperability of the individual sys-
tems. The Czech Republic took the floor concerning the issue of fight against 
extremism and it has mentioned the problems associated with the Russian online 
activities and the results of the ongoing Audit of National Security. The Mal-
ta EU Presidency used this opportunity to present its priorities – revision 
of the common European asylum system, legal migration and the blue card di-
rective, preparation of compacts and framework treaties with third countries, 
the ETIAS, fight against illegal migration, visa policy, fight against terrorism, 
enhancing of information exchange, new action plan against drug smuggling 
for the years 2017–2020.
93 “Salzburg Forum Ministerial Conference, Prague (Czech Republic), 3–4 November 2016”, 
European Council, available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14274-2016-INIT/
en/pdf [accessed: 17.01.2017]. 
77
1.5.4. The Practical Assistance Provided by the Czech Ministry 
of Defence (MoD) and the Czech Army to Deal with the 
Migration Crisis (as of 31 December 2016)
With regards to the deteriorating situation on the Western Balkans route, and in 
the light of the lack of coordinated effort and control over the situation, the Czech 
Republic has decided to contribute to a swift and effective solution of the migra-
tion crisis by providing support on bilateral basis. In particular, the Czech Ministry 
of Defence (MoD) has reacted by extending aid to Hungary and Slovenia. 
Hungary, prior to the construction of the border fence, was one of the main 
entry points into the EU for the refugees. The Czech Government has approved 
on 5 October 2015 the deployment of up to 25 military personnel to Hun-
gary with the task of aiding the Hungarian authorities to guard and protect 
the external boundaries of the EU and the Schengen Area against the migration 
wave. The deployment of the Czech military personnel was carried out on the 
basis of a bilateral agreement between the Czech Republic and Hungary and as 
a response to an invitation from Hungary. The Czech assistance had the form 
of the joint exercise BALATON 2015, which took place over a period of two 
months from 15 October to 15 December 2015. Overall, 21 Czech military 
personnel from the 153rd engineering battalion (based in Olomouc), from the 
151st engineering battalion (based in Bechyně) and from the Logistics Agen-
cy participated in the exercise. Czech military personnel, primarily drivers and 
machine operators, were deployed to the Hódmezövásárhely base in the vicini-
ty of Kaposvár about 40 kilometres from the border line. They carried out tasks 
in support of the Hungarian Armed Forces in the area of logistics support. 
The next joint exercise codenamed BLED 2015/2016 took place in Slov-
enia. At the request of the Slovenian side, 27 Czech troops were deployed 
in the mid-November 2015 to assist their Slovenian colleagues with deal-
ing with migration crisis by providing basic medical aid and logistic support. 
The Czech engineers, together with the Slovenian soldiers, also exercised putting 
up barriers. The military medicine task force was providing aid and expert coun-
sel on the border crossing in Šentilj near Maribor.94 As part of the BLED exer-
cise in 2015 and 2016, a total of 36 members of the Military Medical Agency 
(Agentura vojenského zdravotnictví) and 18 members of the 15thengineering 
regiment took part. The primary goal of this activity was to exercise and im-
prove the capability and capacity of the Czech Army to bolster the protec-
tion of the state borders, both internal and external as related to the Schengen 
94 For more information, see: “2015 – rok klíčových změn pro obranu ČR [2017 – The Year of Key 
Changes for the Czech Defence]”, army.cz, http://www.mocr.army.cz/informacni-servis/zpravodajstvi/ 
2015_rok-klicovych-zmen-pro-obranu-cr-118730/ [accessed: 17.01.2017]. 
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Area. The provision of medical care was not the initial priority of this exer-
cise but, also due to fact that the service members taking part were deployed 
to the border, it became a part of their everyday work. 
The Czech Minister of Defence Martin Stropnický commented on both 
of these bilateral exercises: “The deployment of our military personnel to Hun-
gary and Slovenia in the fall of this year [2015] was our rapid and specific as-
sistance to deal with the migration influx. We are ready to continue this coop-
eration if needed.” He also said: “For the Czech soldiers, the assistance provided 
was an invaluable experience. We are ready to provide further required assist-
ance to Hungarians, Slovenians and other allies at any time to deal with the mi-
gration crisis and the border protection. This assistance could be both in term 
of providing materiel and of deploying our soldiers.”95
Based on the interest expressed by Bulgaria, FYROM and Greece, the 
Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic has prepared and presented 
an offer of possible bilateral cooperation in the context of the migration crisis, 
which would have a similar form like that extended to Hungary and Slovenia. 
The Czech side has offered three specific options for joint bilateral exercises 
in the fall of 2016 – 1) deployment of medical team to Greece and/or FYROM 
(up to 12 military personnel); deployment of an engineering unit to FYROM and 
/or Bulgaria (to build a border fence or to provide logistic support); 3) the de-
ployment of a reconnaissance company to FYROM and/or Bulgaria (to mon-
itor the state borders). None of the target countries have so far (by the end 
of 2016) made use of any of these options offered. As a result, no joint exercises 
have taken place.
1.5.5. The Contribution of the Ministry of Interior 
of the Czech Republic and the Czech Police in Dealing 
with Migration Crisis
The Czech Republic has voluntarily joined the joint European resettlement 
programme, taking on the pledge to resettle 400 refugees from the third coun-
tries between July 2015 and June 2017. By mid-November 2016, 20 Syrian 
refugees from Jordan were resettled (in 2015) as well as 32 Iraqi refugees from 
Lebanon (January–March 2016). The Czech Republic also continues with 
the implementation of the humanitarian reception programme focused on 
the internally displaced refugees in Iraq (Kurdistan); in the first three months 
95 For more information, see: “Návrat zdravotníků ukončil účast na cvičení BLED ve Slovinsku [The 
Return of the Medics Marks the End of the BLED Exercise in Slovenia]”, army.cz, http://www.mocr.
army.cz/informacni-servis/zpravodajstvi/navrat-zdravotniku-ukoncil-ucast-na-cviceni-bled-ve-slovinsku-
120051/ [accessed: 17.01.2017]. 
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of 2016, the first group of 57 persons was resettled as part of this programme. 
The Czech Republic has also put into motion the process of resettling 88 Syrian 
refugees from Turkey. At the moment, the screening of the personal profiles 
and security screening are taking place. 
The relocations are a much more difficult task to handle. On 5 February 
2016, the Czech Republic made an offer to accept the first 20 migrants/refu-
gees from Greece and 10 from Italy. Ultimately, by 25 April 2016, only 4 per-
sons from Greece were chosen to be relocated (3 persons have in the end not 
arrived to attend the transfer procedure). On 13 May 2016, the Czech Repub-
lic has declared to Greece and Italy its readiness to accept 10 more migrants 
/refugees from each of these countries. By 15 November 2016, Italy has not 
reacted to this offer. Thus, in the end, the Czech Republic accepted 8 Syrian 
refugees from Greece.
The Czech Ministry of Interior significantly contributes with its experts and 
police officers to the work of the EASO and FRONTEX agencies. In 2015 
and 2016 alone, 57 experts were chosen to work for the EASO. A total of 45 
of these experts were sent to Greece and Italy. This makes the Czech Republic 
one of the most active EU countries in this regard. By the end of 2016, there 
were 7 Czech experts working in the hotspots (4 in Greece and 3 in Italy). In the 
beginning of 2017, five more experts should be deployed. There are additional 
33 experts nominated for the purposes of the EASO Asylum Intervention Pool 
– these experts would be available for operations of EASO in the EU member 
states that are facing a significant pressure resulting from the migration wave. 
For the purposes of supporting the FRONTEX agency, a special Czech task 
force was assembled – European Border Guard Team (EBGT). This team con-
sists of 95 persons. The members of the police force are deployed in joint op-
erations on regular basis; in 2015 alone, 43 police officers were deployed in this 
manner. In 2016, this number has increased to 157 police officers. The high-
est number of these was allocated for the mission in Greece (92) and Italy (24). 
In addition to these missions, Czech police officers participated in other opera-
tions in Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Spain. 
The Czech Ministry of Interior has contributed to the various missions and 
operations also within the bilateral cooperation framework. It has been in-
volved in Hungary, in two distinct phases. In the time period form 29 Octo-
ber to 15 December 2015, 50 police officers were deployed to perform joint 
patrols on all the external land borders (the green border line, border fence). 
The second phase of the deployment was carried out from 5 September to 
30 October, again with 50 police officers being deployed. With regards to Slo-
venia, from 9 November to 15 December 2015 a total of 20 Czech police 
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officers were present, assisting in carrying out joint patrols on the external bor-
ders (the green border, controls on the train stations, escorting the trains to the 
Austrian borders.
1.6. Conclusion 
(Jan Bečka, Jakub Landovský, Martin Riegl)
What can be said in conclusion to this chapter on the migration crisis per-
ception and impacts as illustrated on the case of Czech Republic? The issue is 
indeed a complex one and it is difficult to draw authoritative conclusions from 
the information which had to be limited to the length of one chapter. Yet, it is 
possible to offer certain insights and suggestions. 
The Czech Republic is often seen as one of the strongest opponents of im-
migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe, an opponent 
of multiculturalism and, lately, also of the EU which to many people comes to 
represent these phenomena. Prague was also criticized, on a number of occa-
sions, for not demonstrating enough solidarity with the other member states 
hit by the crisis and for “not repaying its debt” to the European community. 
Is it really the case, though? 
The research contained in the pages above shows so far as legal framework 
and integration and migration policy are concerned, the Czech Republic dif-
fers in no significant way from other European countries. Indeed, the legisla-
tive framework is to a large degree based on the EU primary law and the EU 
directives are often reflected in it. It is also obvious that the Czech government 
is taking migration seriously, and also in the light of the migration crisis, has 
taken new administrative, legal and practical steps to accommodate the refu-
gees/migrants and to ease their integration into the Czech society. Indeed, the 
government is aware of the fact the labour market, the growing economy and 
the demography make it all necessary to bring in workers (and citizens) from 
abroad. The data clearly testifies to this trend – in 2016, over 382,000 foreigners 
worked in the Czech Republic, an increase by 123,000 over the last two years.96 
Many of the organizations of employers are asking the government to bring 
in even more to satisfy the demand. 
96 “Cizinci plní český pracovní trh. Za dva roky přibylo 120 000 gastarbeiterů [Foreigners Are Filling 
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Source: “Cizinci plní český pracovní trh. Za dva roky přibylo 120 000 gastarbeiterů 
[Foreigners Are Filling the Czech Labour Market. In Two Years, There Is an Increase 
by 120,000 Guest Workers]”, iDNES.cz, http://ekonomika.idnes.cz/pocty-cizincu-v-cr-
037-/ekonomika.aspx?c=A170214_110107_ekonomika_fih [accessed: 16.02.2017].
On the international scene, the Czech Republic, together with the other 
V4, formed a certain bloc or platform within the EU, rejecting the mandatory 
quotas for resettling and redistribution of refugees, asking for a more effective 
system of border control and refugee registration (including the hotspots both 
in the EU but also outside of its territory) and more action to resolve the roots 
and causes rather than the impacts of the refugee crisis. Yet, it cannot be said 
that in many ways, the country was not active in assisting its partners, both 
in the EU and third countries, mainly in the Western Balkans. Chapter IV has 
discussed in detail the various contributions – financial, experts, military per-
sonnel, materiel – that were extended to other countries and to the EU itself 
over the last two years. At the same time, the government is trying to better tar-
get its humanitarian and development aid on the national level, also with the 
view to improve the situation in the countries/regions of origin of the migrants 
coming to Europe.
Perhaps the most controversial part then remains the overall discourse con-
cerning migration on the domestic political scene and among the general pu-
blic. As discussed above in Chapter III, there are several factors coming into 
play. On the part of the society, it is definitely the security aspect which sho-
uld be mentioned here. Especially due to the extensive (but not always ac-
curate) media coverage of the developments in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, 
in some cases Yemen) but perhaps much more importantly of the terrorist at-
tacks – both only planned and actually executed – in Western Europe, the 
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get its humanitarian and development aid on the national level, also with the 
view to improve the situation in the countries/regions of origin of the migrants 
coming to Europe.
Perhaps the most controversial part then remains the overall discourse con-
cerning migration on the domestic political scene and among the general pu-
blic. As discussed above in Chapter III, there are several factors coming into 
play. On the part of the society, it is definitely the security aspect which sho-
uld be mentioned here. Especially due to the extensive (but not always ac-
curate) media coverage of the developments in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, 
in some cases Yemen) but perhaps much more importantly of the terrorist at-
tacks – both only planned and actually executed – in Western Europe, the 
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migration problem has been “securitized” and the migrants coming to Europe 
from the countries such as Iraq or Syria are often viewed with suspicion, if not 
with open enmity. This feeling is further bolstered by the news in the mainstre-
am media about the crimes that the migrants have committed in Western Eu-
rope and their links to terrorist organizations. Again it has to be kept in mind 
that out of the tens of thousands of refugees, those guilty of crimes or suppor-
ters of terrorism and organizations like Islamic State form a definite minority, 
their image has grown to a disproportionate size in the public discourse. In ad-
dition, the Czech Muslim community is still comparatively extremely small, 
especially given the fact that the Czech Republic is not a desired country of de-
stination.97 As mentioned earlier in the text, working with fear and anxiety is 
the easiest (although only temporarily successful) tactic for gaining public sup-
port and seems to have been working quite well so far in the Czech Republic. 
This then leads to the final conclusion or suggestion. It has been discussed 
in Chapter III how migration, coupled with terrorism and with (so far mo-
stly verbal) attacks on Islam and Muslims have become an important of the 
discourse on the political level and how certain individuals, or even parties, 
are trying to use this to gain advantage in the upcoming elections. While this 
is definitely worrying, it has to be kept in mind that: a) this phenomenon is 
not unique to the Czech Republic – in fact, it is possible to witness the surge 
of populist political parties in a number of countries including France, Germa-
ny, the UK, Netherlands or even Finland and Sweden. While the opinion polls 
in the Czech Republic do not seem to give much chance to the populist parties 
of becoming a decisive or even important factor after the upcoming elections, 
in other countries they are coming much closer; b) the migration wave has ap-
parently already reached its peak (at least for the time being) and has been rece-
ding. It could be expected that the interest of the public, and consequently the 
public support for the populists, will recede as well; c) as for the Czech political 
scene in general (as discussed above), some of the mainstream politicians have 
picked up on the issue of migration as well, but this could be seen as a reaction 
to the developments and the attempt to “steal back” votes from the populists. 
Once this becomes useless, it is likely that the migration issue will be accredited 
much less importance in the mainstream political discourse.
97 On the “danger” that the Czech Muslim community currently poses and on the way this is presented 
in the media, see e.g. “Čeští muslimové respektují zákony, radikálům se brání sami, ujišťuje BIS. Terror 
u nás prý nehrozí”, idnes.cz, 9 January 2017, https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/cesti-muslimove-nechteji-
vyvolavat-strety-nebo-provokovat-zn/r~8e89bdaed67b11e694810025900fea04/?redirected=1487237890 
[accessed: 14.01.2017]; “Anatomie českých muslimů. Fascinující a mimořádně pestrý svět”, lidovky.cz, 
11 February 2017, http://www.lidovky.cz/anatomie-ceskych-muslimu-fascinujici-a-mimoradne-pestry-
svet-pub-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A170211_115705_ln_domov_ele [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
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